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CHALLENGING DETENTION: WHY IMMIGRANT
DETAINEES RECEIVE LESS PROCESS THAN "ENEMY
COMBATANTS" AND WHY THEY DESERVE MORE
Faiza W. Sayed*
As a result of the national attention on the "War on Terror," legal
literature has focused on examining executive detention of alleged "enemy
combatants"at the United States naval base at Guantdnamo Bay. In particular, academics and courts have and are currently actively debating the sufficiency of the process afforded to Guantdnamo detainees to challenge their
detention. Meanwhile, little attention has been given to a form of executive
detention that our country has practiced since virtually the beginning of our
nationhood and that affects many more individuals than detention at
Guantdnamo-the detention of immigrants pending removal proceedings.
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act mandates the detention of
certain immigrants with criminal histories, little has been written about the
process these immigrants receive to challenge their detention. And, despite
their similarities, the two forms of detention-executive detention of "enemy
combatants" at Guantdnamo and of immigrants pending removal proceedings-have not been compared. This Note fills that void by comparingthe
processes afforded to the two sets of detainees to challenge their detention. It
then argues, based on the comparison, that immigrant detainees deserve more

process to protect against erroneous detention and proposes ways to reform
immigrant challenges to mandatory detention.
INTRODUCTION

Mr. B and Murat Kurnaz were both erroneously detained by the
United States for years before finally winning their freedom from detention, but their similarities end there. 1 Mr. B was a lawful permanent resi-

dent (LPR) of the United States for forty years when he was placed in
mandatory immigrant detention and held for four years because Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers incorrectly believed his
conviction for two misdemeanors made him removable. Murat Kurnaz,
on the other hand, was a twenty-year old Turkish citizen and German
legal resident when he was detained at Guantanamo Bay for five years

because the government alleged he was an "enemy combatant." Both
challenged their detention and were eventually released; however, the
bodies reviewing their claims would apply very different standards in determining whether they were properly detained.
In order for Mr. B to challenge his mandatory detention, he would
have to ask for a Joseph hearing. A Joseph hearing is an administrative hear* J.D. Candidate 2012, Columbia Law School.
1. Murat Kurnaz, Five Years of My Life: An Innocent Man in Guantanamo 15-18
(Jefferson Chase trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2008); Amnesty Int'l, Jailed Without Justice 22
(2009).
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ing before an immigration judge (IJ) in immigration court convened to
determine whether the immigrant is "properly included" within the
mandatory detention provision. At the hearing, the IJ would determine
whether the noncitizen2 had met his burden in showing that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 3 is "substantiallyunlikely to es-

tablish .. . the charge or charges that would otherwise subject the [noncitizen] to mandatory detention." 4 In contrast, Murat Kurnaz would chal-

lenge his detention by filing a habeas corpus petition with the D.C.
District Court, where the judge would decide if the government had met its
burden, by a preponderanceof evidence, that Kurnaz was an "enemy combatant." 5 This describes just two of the ways detainees at Guantanamo Bay
are surprisingly afforded more procedural protections than are immigrant6 detainees subject to mandatory detention. This Note examines immigrant detention in light of the similar form of executive detention at
Guantanamo Bay; argues that, based on this comparison, immigrants deserve more process to protect against erroneous detention; and proposes
ways to reform immigrant challenges to mandatory detention.
Part I provides a brief history of immigrant detention and detention
at GuantAnamo, describes the current statutory framework supporting
both forms of detention, and concludes with a broad overview of detention today in both contexts. Part II compares the processes afforded to
immigrant detainees and to GuantAnamo detainees, highlights procedural problems with Joseph hearings, and offers three explanations for why
the two sets of executive detainees receive such disparate procedures
when challenging the legality of their detention. In light of the procedures executive detainees at GuantAnamo receive, Part III proposes ways
in which the government can provide immigrant detainees more process
2. This Note replaces the term "alien" in statutory text, judicial opinions, and other
sources with the term "noncitizen" and intends the terms to have the same meaning.
"Alien" is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." INA
§ 101(a) (43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43). Throughout, this Note provides parallel citations to
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), when referencing the U.S. Code,
even if the language in question did not originate with the INA.
3. In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which replaced the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). DHS contains three bureaus-Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)-which inherited the INS's functions. The
other agency that plays a role in immigration matters within the United States is the
Department ofJustice (DOJ). The DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
houses the immigration judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See
generally Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin & Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 269-74, 278-84 (6th ed. 2008)
(describing responsibilities of DHS and DOJ units).
4. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (B.I.A. 1999) (emphasis added).
5. Case Management Order, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442
(TFH), at 4 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008).
6. This Note uses the term "immigrant" to refer to lawful permanent residents.

2011 ]

CHALLENGING DETENTION

1835

and explains why adding such procedures may actually further the government's own interests.

I.

DETENTION OF IMMIGRANTS AND "ENEMY COMBATANTS": BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has deemed physical liberty "the most elemental
of liberty interests."7 Given the high importance of physical liberty in our
constitutional scheme, executive detention of immigrants and alleged
"enemy combatants" has unsurprisingly spawned numerous court challenges and entire fields of academic scholarship. But despite their similarities, the two forms of detention have not been compared-this Note fills
that void. This Part provides a foundation for the comparison by first discussing the history, statutory framework, and current reality of immigrant
detention and then does the same for detention at Guant~namo Bay.
A. Immigrant Detention: History and Current Framework

The detention of immigrants in the United States is not a new phenomenon; rather it "is as old as immigration law itself." 8 What has
changed about immigrant detention is the sheer number of immigrants
who may be detained, the number of immigrants actually detained, 9 and
the length of detention. 10 The first part of this section traces the history
of immigrant detention in the United States, which began as a short-term
measure for noncitizens whose admissibility was in question, quickly developed into a mechanism for dealing with perceived national security
threats, and is now a primary means of enforcing the immigration laws.
This section then explains the current statutory framework mandating
the expansive role of detention in the enforcement of the immigration
laws and discusses Supreme Court decisions concerning limits on immigrant detention. It concludes with statistics and figures that lend a broad
overview of the reality of immigrant detention today.
7. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 690 (2001) ("Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause]
protects.").
8. Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 Intercultural
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 11, 12 (2010).
9. See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigrant Detention, 110 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42,
(2010), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/
44-45
42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf. ("In 1994, officials held approximately 6,000 noncitizens in detention
on any given day. That daily average had surpassed 20,000 individuals by 2001 and 33,000
by 2008. . . . This growth has been fueled by enforcement policies that subject ever-larger
categories of individuals to removal charges and custody . ... ").
10. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (providing statistics of length of
detention); see also Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigrant
Detention, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 601, 602 (2010) ("While it is true that the majority of
detainees are removed quickly, a significant minority-about 2100 per year-languish in
detention for a year or more while they pursue legal challenges.").
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1. A Brief History of Immigrant Detention in the Modern Era. - Prior to
the 1980s, the government used immigrant detention in three primary
circumstances: (1) when a noncitizen's admissibility into the country was

in question due to health or support reasons, 1 ' (2) during a noncitizen's
removal proceeding,1 2 and (3) during times of national emergency.' 3
In the 1980s a shift in detention policy took place as a result of massive Cuban, Haitian, and Central American immigration to the United
States. Detention was used as an immediate response to the massive influx of 125,000 "Marielitos" from Cuba and later to deal with the mass
arrival of Haitian asylum seekers. 14 The Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS) soon began using detention as a deterrent to illegal immigration.1 5 At the same time, because of the ongoing public attention to
11. Detention at this time was usually for a brief period-just long enough for the
infection to pass, or for the detainee to be declared inadmissible and ordered returned.
See Ann Novotny, Strangers at the Door: Ellis Island, Castle Garden, and the Great
Migration to America 11-12 (1973) ("If any serious contagious illnesses had been
reported, the patients would have been [quarantined] . . . while other passengers would
have been held in strict isolation . .. . [T] hose whom the inspectors judged too weak, old
or poor to support themselves would be detained, then deported ... ."); see also T. Pitkin,
Keepers of the Gate: A History of Ellis Island 13, 23-24, 73 (1975) (discussing history of
immigrant detention at Ellis Island-"the first federal immigration station"-from 1892
and 1955). But see Roger Daniels, No Lamps Were Lit for Them: Angel Island and the
Historiography of Asian American Immigration, 17 J. Am. Ethnic Hist. 3, 3-8 (1997)
(describing practice of detaining Asian immigrants for prolonged periods of time at Angel
Island Immigration Station from 1910 to 1940).
12. A "removal proceeding" is the general term used to refer to the procedure of
removing noncitizens from the country. See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at 1027-96
(describing removal proceedings). Early on, the Supreme Court affirmed the
government's authority to use detention pending a noncitizen's removal proceeding. See
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) ("[D]etention, or temporary
confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the
exclusion or expulsion of [noncitizens] would be valid.").
13. The first manifestation of this was the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, which provided
that whenever there is a declared war with another country, male nationals of that country
age fourteen and up may be detained or removed by proclamation of the President. 1 Stat.
577 (codified at amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)). The provision restricting the law
to males was eliminated in 1918. Act of Apr. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 531. Detaining noncitizens
became a recurring phenomenon during periods of national emergency: Noncitizens
purportedly dedicated to the violent overthrow of the government were detained during
the Red Scare raids of the 1920s, "enemy aliens" were detained during World Wars I and II,
noncitizens affiliated with the Communist party were detained during the Cold War, and,
most recently, noncitizens of Muslim descent were detained after the September 11
terrorist attacks. See generally John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativism, 1860-1925, at 209-12 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing detention of German citizens
during World War I); Benson, supra note 8, at 26-38 (describing in detail Red Scare raids
and detentions); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (2003) (discussing similarities and differences
between government treatment of noncitizens during Cold War and after September 11).
14. Stephanie J. Silverman, Immigration Detention in America: A History of Its
Expansion and a Study of Its Significance 9-10 (Ctr. on Migration, Policy & Soc'y, Working
Paper No. 80, 2010).
15. Id. at 10.
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increasing crime and drug use rates, the INS began focusing on the detention and removal of noncitizens convicted of drug crimes.' 6
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198817 created the concept of an "aggravated felony."1 8 The Act further provided for the mandatory detention of
aggravated felons by eliminating the Attorney General's (AG) discretion
in custody determinations concerning immigrants convicted of aggravated felonies. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)1 9

and

the

Illegal

Immigration

Reform

and

Immigrant

Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) 20 amended the INA to drastically increase
the use of detention. The amendments widened the definition of what
constitutes an aggravated felony 21 and broadened the use of mandatory
detention by applying it to noncitizens who had committed certain
crimes, asylum seekers, and noncitizens with final orders of removal. 22

In responding to another national emergency, the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the government again turned to the detention of
noncitizens. 2 3 Following the attacks, Attorney General Ashcroft revised
16. Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 Harv.
L. Rev. 1915, 1919-20 (2002).
17. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.).
18. Id. § 7343(a), 102 Stat. at 4470 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1)
(2006)). An "aggravated felony" is an immigration term of art. The original definition of
an "aggravated felony" included murder; any drug-trafficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2) (2006), as amended; any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921; or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act,
committed within the United States. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70 (codified as amended in
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). The current provision lists twenty categories of offenses that
constitute an "aggravated felony" and makes an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the
specified offenses an "aggravated felony" as well. The list includes particularly serious
crimes, such as murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor, but also much less egregious
crimes, such as theft, counterfeiting, or forgery. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (A), (G), (P), (R).
The less serious crimes usually require a sentence or term of imprisonment of at least one
year to trigger detention in relation to removal proceedings. Id. § 1101(a) (43) (G), (J),
(P), (R), (S).
19. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
20. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
21. See supra note 18 for a discussion of the widening definition of an "aggravated
felony."
22. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); INA § 236(c), 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c); INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
23. Under the authority of the immigration laws, male, Muslim foreign nationals,
mostly of Arab and South Asian descent, were detained for various immigration violations.
The real purpose of these detentions was to interrogate the individuals as part of the FBI's
terrorism investigation-the immigration laws were merely a tool to facilitate this. See
Office of Inspector Gen., DOJ, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of
Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the
September 11 Attacks 195 (2003) ("In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
the Department of Justice used the federal immigration laws to detain [noncitizens] who
were suspected of having ties to the attacks or terrorism in general. . . . In other times,
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immigration rules to double the time the government may detain a
noncitizen before placing him in removal proceedings, or charging him
with a crime. 24 The USA PATRIOT Act, 25 also passed in response to the
attacks, added a final category of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention: suspected terrorists.
2. Current Statutory Framerwork Governing Immigrant Detention. -

Immi-

gration-related detention is governed by the INA, which prescribes both
discretionary 26 and mandatory detention. All immigrants in removal proceedings are potentially subject to either form of detention. This section
presents a framework for understanding mandatory detention today by
providing an outline of the statutory provisions governing mandatory immigrant detention.
The Secretary of Homeland Security and the AG must detain five
categories of noncitizens: (1) certain arriving noncitizens, (2) noncitizens
subject to "expedited removal," 27 (3) noncitizens who have certain crimimany of these [noncitizens] might not have been arrested or detained for these
violations.").
24. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2011). The government may now detain a noncitizen for
forty-eight hours before putting him in removal proceedings or charging him with a crime.
However, "in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance" the
government may continue detention for "an additional reasonable period of time." Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
the U.S.C.).
26. Section 236(a) of the INA allows for the arrest and detention of a noncitizen
"pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States."
INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 236(e) of the INA provides that the AG's
discretionary judgments regarding detention or release of a noncitizen are not reviewable
by any court. INA § 236(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court held
that section 236(e), because it contains no explicit provision barring habeas review, does
not strip courts ofjurisdiction to hear habeas petitions bringing constitutional challenges
to mandatory detention. 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003).
27. "Expedited removal" is a process whereby a noncitizen may be ordered removed
by the inspecting immigration officer "without further hearing or review unless the
or a fear of persecution." INA
[noncitizen] indicates an intention to apply for asylum ...
§ 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). If the noncitizen indicates either an
intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, the officer must refer him to an
interview with an asylum officer. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
The noncitizen must be detained pending the interview, which will take place no earlier
than 48 hours later. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); see
Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (interim rule
Mar. 6, 1997) (codified as amended in scattered parts of the C.F.R.). The noncitizen may
consult with anyone of his choosing after the secondary inspection and before the asylum
interview, but at no expense of the government and without causing "unreasonabl[e]
delay." INA § 235(b)(1)(B) (iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (iv). If the asylum officer finds
no credible fear, the officer can order the noncitizen removed without further review or
hearing. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). If the officer finds
that the noncitizen does have a credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen is scheduled
for a full merits hearing before an IJ. The noncitizen is mandatorily detained pending a
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if no credible fear is found, until
removed. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
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nal convictions, (4) suspected terrorists, and (5) noncitizens who have

final orders of removal. Each category is discussed in further detail below.
a. Arriving Noncitizens. - Under INA section 235(b) (2) (A), if the ex28
amining immigration officer determines that an arriving noncitizen is

not "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen]
shall be detained."29 These noncitizens may be released on parole if they
fall into a few enumerated categories: (1) those with serious medical conditions, (2) pregnant women, (3) juveniles, (4) witnesses in government

proceedings in the United States, and (5) noncitizens "whose continued
detention is not in the public interest." 3 0
b. Noncitizens Subject to Expedited Removal. -

Noncitizens subject to

"expedited removal" must be detained pending determination of their
admissibility and removal.3 1 Arriving noncitizens subject to expedited re-

moval are those who are inadmissible under section 212(a) (6) (C) (relating to attempts to obtain admission or other immigration benefits
through fraud or misrepresentation) or section 212(a) (7) (lack of a valid

passport, visa, or other required document).32
c. Noncitizens with Criminal Convictions. - Section 236(c) of the INA
requires detention of noncitizens who have been convicted of certain
crimes "when the [noncitizen] is released, without regard to whether the
[noncitizen] is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and
28. An "arriving alien," as defined by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 1001.1(q), includes
noncitizens seeking admission into the United States, noncitizens seeking transit through
the United States, noncitizens interdicted and brought into the United States, and
noncitizens paroled into the United States under section 212(d) (5). Section 101(a)(13) of
the INA defines admission as "the lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." INA § 101(a)(13) (A), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (A). A returning LPR is now presumed not to be seeking admission,
unless he has abandoned or relinquished LPR status, has been absent from the United
States for a continuous period of at least 180 days, has engaged in illegal activity after
departing the United States, has departed from the United States while under legal process
seeking his removal, has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), or is
attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or
has not been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization. INA
§ 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).
29. INA § 235(b) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2) (A).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. Parole decisions are made by ICE district directors. IJs lack
jurisdiction to review bond decisions involving arriving noncitizens, including LPRs. 8
C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(11), 1003.19(h) (2) (i) (B).
31. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii).
32. The INA also grants the Secretary of Homeland Security permission to expedite
the removal of any noncitizen who entered without inspection (EWI) and who cannot
prove that he has been physically present in the United States continuously for the two
years preceding. INA § 235(b) (1) (A) (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1) (A) (iii). In 2004, pursuant
to this grant of authority, DHS announced that it would begin applying expedited removal
to EWIs found within 100 miles of the Mexican or Canadian border who cannot show that
they have been present in the United States for at least fourteen days. Press Release, Dep't
of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Expanded Border Control Plans (Aug. 10, 2004, 12:00
Am), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pressrelease_0479.shtm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).

1840

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:1833

without regard to whether the [noncitizen] may be arrested or impris-

oned again for the same offense." 33 These crimes include conviction of
two or more "crimes involving moral turpitude" (CIMT) 34 at any time
after the noncitizen's admission to the United States, an aggravated fel-

ony, 35 a controlled substance violation, a firearm offense, some cases of
single CIMTs, and various other crimes. 36 There is a narrow exception

that allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to release a noncitizen
subject to mandatory detention for witness protection or for cooperation
with a criminal investigation, but only if he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. 3 7
d. Suspected Terrorists. - In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act3 8 added
section 236A to the INA. This provision requires the AG to detain, pend-

ing the noncitizen's removal proceeding, any noncitizen who is engaged
in any activity that may endanger national security. 39 The AG may detain
the noncitizen for up to seven days prior to placing him in removal proceedings or charging him criminally.40 Detention under section 236A re33. INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The ambiguity of the "when released" language
has led to much litigation. For instance, the BIA held in West that the immigrant must be
released from physical custody for mandatory detention to apply. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405, 1406
(B.I.A. 2000). However, an arrest is enough to meet the physical custody requirement even
if no sentence was ever served for the crime. Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 125 (B.I.A. 2007).
In Rjas the Board clarified that mandatory detention under section 236(c) applies even if
the noncitizen is not immediately taken into custody by DHS when released from
incarceration. 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 117 (B.I.A. 2001). Many courts have subsequently held
that the provision does not apply to an immigrant released from custody long before DHS
attempts to take him into immigrant detention. See, e.g., Waffi v. Loiselle, 527 F. Supp. 2d
480, 485-88 (E.D. Va. 2007) (holding mandatory detention provision does not apply to
criminal noncitizen taken into immigration custody one month after release from state
custody). Most recently, the BIA in Garcia Arreoloa held that section 236(c) requires
mandatory detention of a criminal noncitizen only if he is released from non-DHS custody
after the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules and only if the release from
physical custody is directly tied to the basis for detention under section 236(c)(1)(A)-(D).
25 I. & N. Dec. 267, 271 (B.I.A. 2010).
34. A conviction for a "crime involving moral turpitude" (CIMT) has been a chief
ground of removal for the past one hundred years, but despite this long history the exact
meaning of the provision is still "maddeningly vague." Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at
737. One popular definition of a CIMT is: "'an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general .... '"
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1970)). It is generally
accepted that serious crimes against persons or property, as well as crimes with an element
of fraud, are CIMTs. Id. at 742.
35. See supra note 18 for discussion of aggravated felonies.
36. INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
37. INA § 236(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2).
38. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
the U.S.C.).
39. INA § 236A(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a) (1).
40. INA § 236A(a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a) (5). If the noncitizen is not placed in
removal proceedings or charged criminally, the AG "shall release the [noncitizen]." Id. If
the noncitizen is placed in such proceedings, the AG is required to continue detaining him
"irrespective of any relief from removal for which the [noncitizen] may be eligible, or any
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quires certification by the AG or deputy AG, which must be reviewed
every six months, that the noncitizen has engaged in terrorist activities or

any other activity that may endanger the national security. 41
e. Noncitizens

with

Final Orders

of

-

Removal.

INA

section 241(a) (1) (A) states, "when a[ ] [noncitizen] is ordered removed,
the [Secretary of Homeland Security] shall remove the [noncitizen] from

the United States within a period of 90 days." 42 During this ninety-day
removal period the Secretary of Homeland Security "shall detain" the
noncitizen. 4 3 However, section 241(a) (6) declares that a noncitizen
ordered removed who is inadmissible [because of violations of

status requirements entry conditions, criminal convictions, or
on national security/foreign policy grounds] or who has been

determined by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to be a risk
to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period .

. .

3. Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Immigrant Detention. -

.44
The first

case concerning immigrant detention under the amended INA to reach
the Supreme Court was Zadvydas v. Davis, in which the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of INA section 241(a) (6), a provision authorizing further detention of certain removable noncitizens beyond the

ninety-day removal period. 45 The two petitioners had final orders of removal; however, the government had been unable to repatriate them be-

cause either their countries of origin refused to accept them or no other
country would take them. 46 In order to avoid constitutional invalidation,
the Court construed section 241(a) (6) to have an implicit "reasonable
time" limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court re-

relief from removal granted the [noncitizen]" until the AG determines that the noncitizen
no longer fits into any of the categories of noncitizens who may be certified. INA
§ 236A(a) (2).
41. INA § 236A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(3). A noncitizen certified under this
provision whose removal is unlikely to occur "in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be
detained for additional periods of up to six months only if the release of the [noncitizen]
will threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or
any person." Id. section 236A(a) (6). The AG has never exercised his power under section
236A. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at 1100.
42. INA § 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(1)(A).
43. INA § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
44. INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
45. 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
46. Id. at 684-86.
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view. 47 The Court created a six-month presumptive limit on detention.48

After this period expires, and the noncitizen provides "good reason to
believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future," he is eligible for conditional release.4 9
In Demore v. Kim, an LPR who had been detained for six months
during the pendency of his removal hearing pursuant to section 236(c)

of the INA challenged the constitutionality of that provision.50 The Supreme Court held that mandatory detention of criminal noncitizens
47. Id. at 682. The Ninth Circuit has extended this decision to apply to detention
under sections 236(a), 235(b) (1)(B) (ii), and 235(b)(2)(A). Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534
F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Consistent with Zadvydas, we construe the Attorney
General's detention authority under [236(a)] as limited to the 'period reasonably
necessary to bring about [a noncitizen]'s removal from the United States ... "' (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689)); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Rather, consistent with the Supreme Court's approach in Zadvydas, we conclude that
[sections 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(A)] permit detention only while removal remains
reasonably foreseeable."). The Sixth Circuit has extended it to detention under
section 236 in general. See Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Since
permanent detention of Permanent Resident Aliens under § 236 would be
unconstitutional, we construe the statute to avoid that result, as did the Court in
Zadvydas."). The Third Circuit recently extended the decision to section 236(c). See Diop
v. ICE/Homeland Sec., No. 10-1113, 2011 WL 3849739, at *9 (3d Cir. Sept. 1, 2011)
("[Section 236(c)] implicitly authorizes detention for a reasonable . . . time, after which
the authorities must make an individualized inquiry into whether detention is still
necessary to fulfill the statute's purposes of ensuring that a[ ] [noncitizen] attends removal
proceedings and that his release will not pose a danger to the community.").
48. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. After Zadvydas, several courts have had to determine
whether removal in an individual case is "reasonably foreseeable." See, e.g., Lema v. INS,
341 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[W]hen a[ ] [noncitizen] refuses to cooperate fully
and honestly with officials to secure travel documents from a foreign government, the
[noncitizen] cannot meet his or her burden to show there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future."); Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F. Supp. 2d
37, 50 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering release of petitioner after more than forty-six months in
detention because it was clear that country of origin was not willing to accept the petitioner
and INS's efforts had been "belated at best, and for long periods totally non-existent").
49. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. By regulation, the detainee must first prove that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and that he has
cooperated in the process of obtaining necessary travel documents. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(d)
(2011). If the noncitizen makes this showing, and there are no special circumstances, he
will be released under conditions meant "to protect the public safety and to promote the
ability of the [DHS] to effect the [noncitizen]'s removal." Id. § 241.13(h). Even if there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, a noncitizen may
still be detained if he falls into the following categories: (1) noncitizens with a highly
contagious disease that is a threat to public safety, (2) noncitizens detained on account of
serious adverse foreign policy consequences of release, (3) noncitizens detained on
account of security or terrorism concerns, or (4) noncitizens determined to be specially
dangerous. Id. §§ 241.13(e) (6), 241.14.
Four years later, in Clark v. Martinez, the Court extended the Zadvydas holding to the
other two categories of noncitizens held beyond the ninety-day removal period under
section 241(a) (6)-inadmissible noncitizens and those ordered removed whom the
Secretary deems to be a danger to the community or pose a flight risk. 543 U.S. 371,
377-78 (2005).
50. 538 U.S. 510, 514 (2003).
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pending a determination of their removability under section 236(c) was
constitutional, because Congress was "justifiably concerned that deport-

able criminal [noncitizens] who are not detained continue to engage in
crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers." 51
The Court distinguished Zadvydas on two grounds: (1) In Zadvydas the
noncitizens challenging their detention after final orders of removal were
ones for whom removal was "'no longer practically attainable"' and (2) in

Zadvydas the period of detention was "'indefinite' and 'potentially permanent,"' whereas in this case the detention was "of a much shorter
duration."5 2
4. Immigrant Detention Today. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is in charge of the detention and removal of nonci-

tizens. ICE "operates the largest detention system in the country," 53 detaining immigrants in 300 adult and three family detention facilities
across the nation. 54 The average daily detained population for FY 2009

was 32,098.55 The average length of stay in FY 2009 was 25.8 days for
51. Id. at 513.
52. Id. at 527-28 (quoting Zadrydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91). The Court in Demore
acknowledged that Kim had been detained longer than most under section 236(c), but
emphasized the brief nature of most immigrants' detention pending removal. Id. at
530-31. Subsequently, several circuit and district courts have held that section 236(c) does
not permit prolonged detention. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942, 950-52
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding noncitizen detained for seven years while challenging removal has
right to bond hearing); Ly, 351 F.3d at 271-73 (finding one-and-a-half-year detention of
noncitizen when there was no chance of actual, final removal unreasonable and in
violation of substantive due process rights); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d
455, 464-79 (D. Mass. 2010) (ordering bail hearing for noncitizen detained for twenty-two
months in violation of due process); Scarlett v. DHS, 632 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220-23
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding five years of mandatory detention unconstitutional). Not all
challenges have been favorable to the noncitizen. See, e.g., Prince v. Mukasey, 593 F. Supp.
2d 727, 735-36 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding sixteen-month pre-final order detention not
unreasonable where length was in part due to actions of petitioner and a hearing was
scheduled); Ovchinnikov v. Clark, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (holding
eleven-month detention not unreasonable due to appeal and foreseeable removal); Ali v.
Achim, 342 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771-75 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding no due process violation as a
result of noncitizen's twenty-eight-month detention during removal proceedings). No
court has developed a bright-line rule for when detention under section 236(c) becomes
unconstitutional; rather, courts examine a number of factors when deciding whether a
detainee deserves to be released. The factors examined are not always the same. Compare
Andreenko v. Holder, No. 09 Civ. 8535, 2010 WL 2900363, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010)
(examining (1) length of detention, (2) petitioner's concession of deportability, (3) lack
of government foot-dragging and petitioner's partial responsibility for delay, (4) likelihood
of additional prolonged detention, (5) likelihood of ultimate removal, and (6) likelihood
of receiving relief), with Fuller v. Gonzales, No. 3:04CV2039SRU, 2005 WL 818614, at *5
(D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005) (examining solely (1) length of detention and (2) likelihood of
additional prolonged detention).
53. Dora Schriro, DHS, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 6
(2009) [hereinafter Schriro Report].
54. Gov't Accountability Office (GAO), Alien Detention Standards 1, 7-8 (2007).
55. DHS, ICE.Removals 1 (2010).
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noncriminal detainees and 41 days for criminal detainees. 56 A study focusing only on immigrants in detention found that the average length of

stay for pre-removal order detainees on January 25, 2009 was 81 days. 57
Of the 18,690 pre-removal order detainees in custody on that day, 13,842
had been detained for less than ninety days, 2486 had been detained for
between ninety days and six months, 1792 had been detained for between
six months and one year, and 570 had been detained for one year or
more. 58
B. Detention at Guantdnamo Bay: History and Current Reality

The current law concerning the rights of detainees held at
Guantinamo Bay has developed as a result of an active back and forth
discussion between the Executive, Congress, and the Courts. 59 Although
the Executive's initial decision to detain individuals at Guantinamo and

later decisions concerning what process to afford these individuals
seemed to be made under the authority of legislation passed by Congress,60 the Supreme Court has not been wholly deferential.
This section first details the historical framework behind the current

Guantinamo litigation by tracing the Executive's and Congress's reactions to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Supreme Court's as-

sessments of those actions, and concludes by providing a brief picture of
detention at Guantinamo today.

1. Background of Current Guantdnamo Litigation. - After September
11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), authorizing the President to "use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11 attacks, "or
harbored such organizations or persons." 6 1

Pursuant to this authority, in November 2001, President George W.
Bush issued Military Order No. 1, authorizing military detention of
56. Id.
57. Donald Kerwin & Serena YiYing Lin, Migration Policy Inst., Immigrant Detention:
Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities? 16 (2009). Of
the 10,771 immigrants who had received final orders of removal, 8513 had been detained
for less than ninety days (79%), 1266 had been detained for between ninety days and six
months (12%), 676 had been detained for between six months and one year (6%), and
316 had been detained for one year or more (11%). Id. at 17.
58. Id. at 16.
59. See Benjamin Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law
of Detention 2.0: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking 5-7 (2011) [hereinafter
Wittes et al., Emerging Law], available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/
05_guantanamowittes.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing historical
context of current Guantanamo habeas litigation).
60. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (delineating three zones of presidential power and explaining
that the President is at his highest power and the judiciary is most wary stepping in when
he acts with explicit congressional authorization).
61. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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noncitizens whom he believed (i) to be members of al Qaeda or (ii) who
have "engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor" directed at the United
States or its people, or (iii) those who have knowingly harbored those
described in (i) or (ii).62 The order provided that military commissions
would have exclusive jurisdiction to try detained noncitizens and that the
noncitizens would not have any right to bring a claim in any court of the

United States or a foreign nation. In the fall of 2001, when military operations began resulting in captives, the government transferred many of

them to a detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba, as authorized by the order. 63

Just a few years later, a challenge to the executive's authority to detain individuals at Guantanamo Bay reached the Supreme Court. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the AUMF gave the exec-

utive the authority to detain a citizen classified as an enemy combatant. 6 4
However, the Court also stated, "due process demands that a citizen held
in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker." 65 In direct response to Hamdi, the Defense Department

created "Combatant Status Review Tribunals, (CSRTs)" 66 to determine
whether detainees were in fact enemy combatants.
On the same day as the Hamdi decision, in the case of Rasul v. Bush,
the Court held that noncitizens detained at Guantanamo could file habeas
corpus actions in federal court. 67 As a result of this decision, courts
62. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
63. Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 755 (4th ed. 2007).
64. 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
65. Id. at 509.
66. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., Order Establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Wolfowitz, Order
Establishing CSRT] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In 2004, CSRTs were held for
the first time. Of the 532 CSRTs that were held, 503 detainees were determined to be
"enemy combatants." Dep't of Def., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary, http://
www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated Feb. 10, 2009). In total, 581 CSRTs have been held, resulting in findings
confirming "enemy combatant" status in 539 of them. Id. In May 2004, the Administrative
Review Board (ARB) was created "to assess annually the need to continue to detain each
enemy combatant." Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., Order
Establishing Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the Control of
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba 1 (May 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Wolfowitz, Order Establishing ARB] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The first ARBs resulted in the release of 14 detainees, the transfer of 119 detainees, and
the continued detention of 330 detainees. During the last round of ARBs, ninety-nine
hearings were completed, resulting in the transfer of seven detainees and the continued
detention of ninety-two detainees. See Dep't of Def., Administrative Review Board
Summary, www.defense.gov/news/arb4.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated Feb. 6, 2009).
67. 542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004).
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"could suddenly address both the substantive scope of the executive
branch's authority to employ military detention and the nature of the
process to be employed in determining whether any particular individual
falls within the scope of that authority." 68

Congress responded to Hamdi and Rasul by passing the Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, which stripped the courts of habeas jurisdiction in these cases. 69 However, the Supreme Court, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, held that the DTA did not apply to habeas petitions that were
already pending in the courts when the DTA was passed. 70 Congress then
passed the Military Commission Act (MCA), which stripped the courts of
jurisdiction even in those cases that had been pending when the DTA was
passed. 7 1
It was at this point that the Supreme Court decided Boumediene v.
Bush,72 definitively establishing the role of the courts in these cases. The
Court made two major points. First, noncitizens held at GuantAnamo do
have access to habeas corpus review to challenge the legality of their de68. Wittes et al., Emerging Law, supra note 59, at 5.
69. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The DTA lodged exclusive judicial review of CSRT
determinations in the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2742 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2) (2006)). Judicial review was limited to reviewing whether the CSRT
determination was made in accordance with the standards and procedures set by the
Secretary of Defense and whether those standards and procedures were constitutional. Id.
§ 1005(e)(2) (C), 119 Stat. at 2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2)).
Claims challenging CSRTs could only be brought by, or on behalf of, noncitizens held at
Guantanamo at the time of the request for review and for whom a CSRT had already been
conducted. Id. § 1005(e) (2) (B), 119 Stat. at 2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e) (2)). The Act also limited both civil and criminal actions that could be brought
against government personnel involved in interrogations of detainees by providing a
defense if the person did not know the challenged practice was unlawful and if a person of
ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practice was unlawful. Id.
§ 1004(a), 119 Stat. at 2740 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1(a) (2006)).
70. 548 U.S. 557, 574-84 (2006).
71. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The MCA established comprehensive procedures
governing the military commissions that would have exclusive jurisdiction to try "enemy
combatants." Id. § 948a, 120 Stat. at 2601 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a
(2006)). These procedures related to, inter alia, notice; pretrial, trial, and post-trial
matters; sentencing; the process of convening a military commission; the requirements to
sit on a military commission; and the number of votes required in a military commission.
Id. §§ 948-950, 120 Stat. at 2601-37 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950). The
Act defined "enemy combatant" as "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its cobelligerents" or "a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the
[MCA],... has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a [CSRT] or
another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the
Secretary of Defense." Id. § 948a, 120 Stat. at 2601 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 948a). The courts were also stripped of habeas jurisdiction to hear actions brought by
noncitizens challenging their detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement. Id. § 7, 120 Stat. at 2636 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2441).
72. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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tention. 73 Second, the process afforded by the DTA was not an adequate
replacement of habeas. 74 The Court left to the lower federal courts the
details of the standard that would govern the habeas proceedings. 7 5
Since Boumediene, Congress has not legislated with respect to the
standards and procedures that would govern challenges to Guantinamo
detention, 76 leaving the task of writing the law entirely to the courts. 77 As

of February 3, 2010, over two hundred habeas petitions had been filed in
the D.C. District Court by or on behalf of detainees held at
Guantinamo. 78 Of the fifty-three cases that have been decided, thirtyseven of the petitions have been granted. 79 Those who succeed in their
habeas petitions are not immediately released; rather, at that point the
government will simply consider releasing them. 80 Thirteen of the detain-

ees who have won their habeas petitions remain in indefinite detention. 8 1
2. Detention at Guantdnamo Today. -

According to the New York

Times's online Guantinamo database, 779 detainees have been held at
73. The Court specifically held that it was not deciding "the reach of the writ with
respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement." Id. at 792.
74. Id. at 791.
75. Id. at 798.
76. Peter Baker, Obama Says Current Law Will Support Detentions, N.Y. Times, Sept.
24, 2009, at A23.
77. See Benjamin Wittes & Robert Chesney, Piecemeal Detainee Policy, Wash. Post,
Feb. 5, 2010, at A17 ("President Obama's decision not to seek additional legislative
authority for Guantanamo detentions, along with Congress's lack of interest in taking on
the subject, means that, for good or for ill, judges must write the rules governing military
detentions of terrorist suspects."). Leaving this task to the judiciary has led to the
development of a "contradictory and incoherent body of law"-with judges applying
different rules of evidence, different procedures, and even different substantive law. Jack
Goldsmith & Benjamin Wittes, A Role Judges Should Not Have to Play, Wash. Post, Dec.
22, 2009, at A19 [hereinafter Wittes & Goldsmith, Detention Policy]. Commentators have
"urged the political branches to enact legislation to create a uniform and democratically
legitimate detention policy." Id. But see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and
the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 445, 537 (2010) (arguing detainees'
habeas petitions are "properly within the 'expertise and competence' of the district courts
to manage" (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796)).
78. Jennifer K. Elsea & Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33180, Enemy
Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court 37 (2010).
79. Sixteen detainees, including one whose victory was reversed on appeal, have lost
their habeas petitions. See Chisun Lee, Dig into the Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, ProPublica
(July 22, 2009) [hereinafter Lee, Dig into the Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits], http://
projects.propublica.org/tables/gitmo-detainee-lawsuits (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last updated Aug. 12, 2010) (providing updates, summaries, and court documents
for habeas petitions filed so far).
80. See Chisun Lee, As Gitmo Detainees' Legal Victories Mount, Obama
Administration Resists Orders to Release, ProPublica (Apr. 21, 2010, 10:57 Aa), http://
www.propublica.org/article/as-gitmo-detainees-legal-victories-mount-obama-admin-resistsorders-to-rele (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[I]n the terrorism detention cases,
[a court order of release] promises no more than the 'possibility' of release, U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder said in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee . . .. ").
81. Lee, Dig into the Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, supra note 79.
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GuantAnamo, 600 have been transferred, 8 have died in custody, 8 2 and
171 remain.8 3 In an empirical study of the detainee population in late
2008, Benjamin Wittes and his colleagues stressed that the government
has "never identified the interned population in a contemporaneous
fashion" and that the New York Times's list of the current population may

not have been completely accurate because it had "not been the subject
of serious empirical analysis." 84 The Wittes study reported that on
December 16, 2008, 248 detainees, from thirty different countries, were
held at Guantinamo. 8 5 The study further provided that of "558 detainees
who remained at the base long enough to go through the CSRT process,
330 have been transferred or released." 86

82. The Guantanamo Docket: Dead, N.Y. Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo/detainees/dead (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 18,
2011).
83. The Guantanamo Docket: A History of the Detainee Population, N.Y. Times
[hereinafter the Guantanamo Docket], http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Sept. 27, 2011). The New York Times's
database contains a list of the names of all past and current detainees, their countries of
citizenship, and their current status (transferred or held), as well as the documents the
Department of Defense chose to disclose in 2006. Id. The Center for Constitutional
Rights's "scorecard" shows that 172 detainees remained as of February 9, 2011.
Guantanamo Habeas Scorecard, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, http://www.ccrjustice.org/
files/2011-02-03%20Habeas%20SCORECARD%20Website%20Version.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Feb. 9, 2011).
84. Benjamin Wittes & Zaahira Wyne, Brookings Inst., The Current Detainee
Population of Guantanamo: An Empirical Study 5 (2008) [hereinafter Wittes et al.,
Current Detainee Population], available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/
reports/2008/1216_detainees-wittes/1216_detainees-wittes.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
85. Id. at 6-7. For a complete list of the names and nationalities of the 248 detainees
as well as the basis for finding that the detainees were at Guantanamo, see id. at 23-27
(Note on Sources and Methods); id. at 46-65 (Appendix I).
86. Id at 6. The study concurred with the New York Times that overall 779 detainees
had been held at Guantanamo since its opening in 2002. Id. The Wittes study also provided
a categorization of the detainees, based on government claims and detainees' publically
available self-description. See id. at 9-22 (describing five categories of detainees ranging
from small group of "worst of the worst" to those "held erroneously . . . as a result of
mistakes, confusion, and wrongful identifications"). An earlier study, from 2006, analyzing
Department of Defense data on 517 detainees found that 55% of the detainees were not
determined to have committed any hostile acts against the United States or its allies, 8% of
the detainees were characterized as al Qaeda fighters, and, of the remaining detainees,
40% had no definitive connection with al Qaeda at all and 18% had no definitive affiliation
with either al Qaeda or the Taliban. Mark Denbeaux & Josh Denbeaux, The Guantanamo
Detainees: The Government's Story 2 (2006), available at http://aw.shu.edu/
publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo-report-final_2_08_06.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS

COMPARED

Although immigrant detainees in the United States and detainees at
Guantinamo both face possibly prolonged executive detention, 8 7 the

procedures and standards governing challenges to their detention are
surprisingly different. Section A of this Part describes the Joseph hearing
through which an immigrant detainee may challenge his inclusion within
the mandatory detention provision and concludes with an examination of
three specific problems with the hearings. Section B discusses the greater
administrative procedures Guantinamo detainees receive and the less
stringent standard they face when challenging their classification as "enemy combatants" in court. Section C offers three possible explanations
for the disparate procedures and standards.
A. Procedures and Standards GoverningImmigration Proceedings

An immigrant in mandatory detention must overcome two hurdles
before he is free to return to his predetention life. The first is his Joseph
hearing at which he will challenge his detention. The second hurdle is his

removal hearing at which he will contest his removability. A full discussion of removal proceedings is beyond the scope of this Note; however,
because being detained has a profound affect on an immigrant's ability to

build his case against removal, this section briefly discusses procedures in
removal hearings. It then discusses the standards and procedures governing Joseph hearings and concludes by highlighting three core
problems with the Joseph hearing that increase the likelihood of erroneous detention.
1. Procedures in Removal Hearings. - A unique set of evidentiary rules
apply in an immigrant's removal proceedings. First, the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings. Instead, IJs "have
broad discretion to admit and consider relevant and probative evi87. Indefinite detention of immigrants under section 241(a) (6) was declared
unconstitutional in Zadvydas v. Davis, and, while the Supreme Court declared mandatory
detention under section 236(c) constitutional, it did so under the impression that
detention under that provision is generally short-term. Courts facing challenges to
prolonged mandatory detention have declared that section 236(c) does not permit such
detention. See supra note 52 for a discussion of these cases. In contrast, the White House
has insisted that the AUMF allows for indefinite detention of individuals at GuantAnamo
Bay. Dafna Linzer, White House Drafts Executive Order for Indefinite Detention,
ProPublica (Dec. 21, 2010, 7:11 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/white-housedrafts-executive-order-for-indefinite-detention (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated Dec. 22, 2010). The Obama Administration has asserted that forty-eight detainees
fall into the indefinite detention category. Id. The White House is in the process of
drafting an order that "will offer detainees in this category a minimal review every six
months and then a more lengthy annual review." Id. The detainees will also have an
opportunity to challenge their detention and access to an attorney and to some of the
evidence against them. Id.
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dence." 88 Similarly, despite the seemingly punitive nature of removal, the
safeguards of criminal procedure do not apply in removal proceedings. 89
On the threshold issue of alienage, the government has the burden of
proof. 90 If the individual is indeed a noncitizen he must prove either "by
clear and convincing evidence" that he is "lawfully present . .. pursuant
to a prior admission" or that he "is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to
be admitted and is not inadmissible." 9 1 If the individual has been admitted the government has the burden to establish deportability by "clear
and convincing evidence." 9 2 However, "putting the burden of proof on
the government on alienage and deportability does not matter in the majority of contested cases, which turn instead on relief from removal,
where the noncitizen has the burden." 93
2. Procedures Under Mandatory Detention. -

The initial determination

that an immigrant is mandatorily detainable pursuant to section 236(c) is
made by the ICE district director. 94 The immigrant may challenge this
decision by arguing that he is not "properly included" within the
mandatory detention provision. 95 To do this the immigrant would request aJoseph hearing in immigration court. The hearing was named after
the BIA's decision in Joseph, which created the standard governing such
claims. 96
At the Joseph hearing the detainee may contest his inclusion within
the mandatory detention provision in three ways: (1) by demonstrating
that he is not in fact a noncitizen, (2) by showing that he was not convicted of the predicate crime, 97 or (3) by proving that DHS is "substantially unlikely to prevail" on a charge of removability against him specified
in section 236(c) (1).98 The IJ's decision in the Joseph hearing may be ap88. D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 458 (B.I.A. 2011); see also INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(b)(1) (2006) (describing IJ's authority).
89. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 472 (2007) ("For
more than a century, however, the courts have uniformly insisted that deportation is not
punishment and that, therefore, the criminal procedural safeguards do not apply in
deportation proceedings.").
90. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2011).
91. INA § 240(c) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (2).
92. INA § 240(c) (3) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (3) (A).
93. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at 1047.
94. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) (1).
95. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (2) (ii).
96. 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999).
97. If an immigrant is placed in mandatory detention, but the government has not
charged him with a crime that would result in mandatory detention in the Notice to
Appear (NTA), the charging document that DHS uses to initiate removal proceedings, it
must give the immigrant notice of the basis for mandatory detention and provide an
opportunity to challenge the detention before an IJ in a Joseph hearing. Kotliar, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 124, 127 (B.IA. 2007).
98. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 807; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003)
(holding detainee may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating DHS is "substantially
unlikely to establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention"). In Joseph, the
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pealed to the BIA; however, the BIA is highly deferential to DHS on
appeal. 99
If the immigrant meets his burden at the hearing, the IJ will conduct
a bond hearing using the custody standards of section 236(a) to determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 100 If the IJ

denies bond, the immigrant may appeal the decision to the BIA.1 0 1 If the
IJ sets bond and orders the immigrant's release, DHS may obtain an automatic stay of the order by filing a notice of intent to appeal. 1 0 2 If the

immigrant is unable to meet his burden, he will remain in detention as
the IJ has no authority to conduct a bond hearing for a noncitizen who
does not receive a favorable decision at the Joseph hearing. 103 The Joseph
hearing is thus the only pre-removal opportunity for the immigrant to
win release from detention before his detention becomes prolonged. 104
Habeas review is available to all noncitizens in immigration detention;
respondent, an LPR from Haiti, received a one-year sentence after pleading guilty to the
common law crime of "obstructing and hindering," when he was arrested at the end of a
police chase. Id. at 801-02. He was later placed in mandatory detention under section
236(c) and charged with deportability under section 237(a) (2) (A) (iii) for having
committed an aggravated felony as defined by section 101(a) (43) (S) (obstruction of
justice). Id. at 801. The IJ determined that his crime did not constitute an aggravated
felony and terminated removal proceedings. Id. The IJ issued an order in a bond
proceeding releasing the respondent from custody. Id. The government appealed both
decisions and obtained an automatic stay of the custody determination pending the appeal
of the bond hearing. Id. However, the BIA in Joseph concluded that it was substantially
unlikely that the crime of "obstructing and hindering" would be viewed as an aggravated
felony for removal purposes because there was significant evidence that the respondent
was seeking to evade his own arrest, rather than obstructing the arrest of another. Id. at
808. (In the precedent decision of Batista-Hernandez the Board emphasized that the
obstruction of justice aggravated felony encompasses hindering or preventing another's
apprehension. 21 1. & N. Dec. 955, 962 (B.I.A. 1997)). Consequently, the IJ was correct in
holding that the respondent was not "properly included" in the mandatory detention
provision. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 808.
99. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) (3). An empirical study of Joseph hearings found that "BIA
shifts the risk of error almost entirely onto the detained noncitizen by construing the
'substantially unlikely' standard to require that nearly all legal and evidentiary
uncertainties be resolved in favor of the DHS." Julie Dona, Making Sense of "Substantially
Unlikely": An Empirical Analysis of the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody
Hearings 5 (June 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1856758 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
100. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 806. Factors considered by the IJ in bond hearings
include the immigrant's employment history, length of residence in the community, family
ties, record of appearance or nonappearance at court proceedings, and previous criminal
or immigration law violations. Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638-39 (B.I.A. 1981).
101. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d) (3), 1236.1(d) (3).
102. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 800.
103. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(1)(i)(E).
104. See Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural Reforms
in "Joseph" Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 51, 75 (2006)
("Without bond hearings or any other opportunity to contest detention, a[ ] [noncitizen]
who seeks pre-removal release must win at her Joseph hearing.").
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however, courts generally order release only when detention has been
unconstitutionally prolonged.' 05
3. ProceduralProblems with Joseph Hearings. - There are three core
problems with Joseph hearings: (1) the burden on the immigrant de-

tainee,1 06 (2) the lack of any other pre-removal opportunity to contest
detention, and (3) the automatic stay provision. 107 This section discusses
each problem in turn; Part III presents solutions.
a. The Burden on the ImmigrantDetainee. - The Joseph hearing places

the burden on the immigrant detainee to show that the government is
"substantially unlikely" to prove that he is in fact subject to mandatory
detention. This burden is too great, 10 8 particularly in light of two factors:
(1) the lack of a right to counsel provided by the government 10 9 and (2)
the complexity of immigration law.
105. The REAL ID Act of 2005 eliminated habeas, mandamus, and all writs
jurisdiction in the district courts with regards to "judicial review of an order of removal
entered or issued under any provision of this Act." REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10913, div. B, § 106(a)(1) (A) (iii), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(2006)). The legislative history makes clear that habeas remains available for "challenges to
detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders." Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005) (Conf.
Rep.); see also Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding REAL
ID does not strip courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to detention independent of
challenges to removal orders); Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795, 797 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)
("[T]he Real ID Act of 2005 . . . does not apply to this case because petitioners do not
challenge or seek review of any removal order."); Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442,
446 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) ("A[ ] [noncitizen] challenging the legality of his detention still may
petition for habeas corpus."). Thus a detainee who loses at a Joseph hearing could bring a
habeas petition in a district court; however, courts generally order release only when
detention has been prolonged. See supra note 52 for circumstances where courts have
ordered release.
106. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (declaring Joseph standard's allocation of burden of proof unconstitutional
and advocating that "[o]nly those immigrants who could not raise a 'substantial' argument
against their removability should be subject to mandatory detention").
107. Shalini Bhargava also points out that Joseph hearings present issues of prejudice
and impartiality. For one, the hearing will alert DHS to issues it must address and evidence
it needs to present at the final removal proceeding. Second, if the same IJ presides over the
Joseph hearing and the final removal hearing, the immigrant may be prejudiced because
the two hearings discuss essentially the same issues and the IJ has already decided at the
Joseph hearing that the government is substantially likely to prevail. See Bhargava, supra
note 104, at 91-92 for a more thorough discussion of this issue and other problems with
Joseph hearings.
108. An empirical study of Joseph hearings found that the IJ ruled in favor of DHS in
120 out of 165 appeals of custody determinations that were reported to Westlaw between
November 1, 2006 and November 1, 2010. Dona, supra note 99, at 10.
109. For a comprehensive discussion of why the government should provide
immigrants in removal proceedings with counsel and why the cost is manageable, see
generally Donald Kerwin, Migration Policy Inst., Revisiting the Need for Appointed
Counsel (2005); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens:
Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647 (1997); Michael Kaufman,
Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 Stan.J.
C.R. & C.L. 113 (2008).
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Immigrants in removal proceedings have the "the privilege of being
represented" by counsel but "at no expense to the government." 110 An
immigrant detainee thus has three options for representation: (1) representing himself, (2) finding pro bono representation, or (3) securing private counsel. Given most detainees' limited financial background and the

lack of incentives for private attorneys to take on a detainee's case securing private counsel is unlikely.1 1 1 As a result, most detained immigrants
appear in immigration court without counsel. 112
i. Problems with Pro Se Representation in Immigration Court. - The lack
of counsel is particularly detrimental in immigration proceedings be-

cause of their incredible complexity. 113 Challenges to mandatory immigrant detention involve some of the most difficult immigration law ques-

tions, such as whether an immigrant has committed a predicate offense,
has been "convicted" for immigration purposes, or is actually a citizen,
and

may even

involve

questions

concerning

the meaning

of the

mandatory detention statute itself. Available empirical evidence shows
that immigrant detainees challenge their detentions at Joseph hearings on
complicated grounds.1"4
110. INA §§ 240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(b)(4)(B), 1362.
111. Most detained immigrants "come from working class communities and have
limited financial resources." Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained
Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78
Fordham L. Rev. 541, 548 (2009). Private attorneys have little incentive to take on
immigration defense cases because they are much more "labor intensive, unpredictable,
and time-consuming endeavor" than transactional immigration services and such clients
are "most likely to default on their financial obligations." Id. at 548-49. Thus, the only
viable option for a detained immigrant seeking counsel is to rely on pro bono
representation; demand for representation, however, far outstrips the funding legal aid
organizations have for immigration defense. Id. at 549-50.
112. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Immigration Detainee Pro Bono Opportunities Guide 1
(2004) (noting only 10% of detained individuals secure counsel); Vera Inst., Improving
Efficiency and Promoting Justice in the Immigration System 1 (2008) (finding that
between October 1, 2006 and September 30, 2007, approximately 84% of detained
immigrants lacked representation). In removal cases in general, 39% of immigrants whose
cases were completed in FY 2009 were represented. Exec. Office for Immigration Review,
DOJ, FY 2009 Statistical Yearbook Al (2010) [hereinafter EOIR Statistical Yearbook 2009].
Fifty percent of the completed cases involved detained immigrants. Id. at A2.
113. The Ninth Circuit has stated, "'[T]he immigration laws have been termed
second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer is often the only person
who could thread the labyrinth.'" Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988)).
114. An empirical study examining 165 appeals of custody determinations in Joseph
hearings found that:
[C] lassification of a respondent's conviction into an enumerated category was by
far the most common challenge; challenges specifically to the classification for
"crimes involving moral turpitude" were presented in 39 percent of appeals.
Several respondents challenged the allegation that they had a conviction at all, or
argued that the conviction was invalid. At least thirteen respondents argued that
the evidence provided by the DHS was insufficient, and four individuals claimed
that they were U.S. citizens.
Dona, supra note 99, at 13.
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The government has tried to ameliorate some of the problems detainees face in representing themselves pro se through the National
Detention Standards.' 15 The standards require, among other things, that
every detention facility have a law library with up-to-date legal materials,
that ICE officials help facilitate group presentations on legal rights, that
detainees be allowed to meet privately with current or prospective legal
representatives, and that detainees have telephone access to make private

calls to legal representatives. Because the standards have no formal enforcement mechanism, studies have found systemic violations. 116
Since 2003, the government has also attempted to help detainees
learn about their legal rights through the Legal Orientation Program
(LOP), run by the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).
Through the program volunteers from legal aid organizations "provide
comprehensive explanations about immigration court procedures along
with other basic legal information to large groups of detained individuals." 117 The presentations have three components: (1) an interactive
group orientation, (2) a brief individual session with a counselor, and (3)
118

a self-help/referral component.
ii. Difficulties with Securing Pro Bono Representation. -

Because of the

complexity of immigration proceedings, a detainee's best option is to secure pro bono representation, but he may face significant difficulty in
finding an effective pro bono attorney willing to take his case. A study of

150 of the approximately 300 detention facilities and 148 legal aid organi115. In November 2000, the INS adopted National Detention Standards that apply to
all facilities where adult detainees are housed. ICE, Detention Operation Manual (2000),
available at http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2000/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). The standards were updated in 2008, based on performance. The standards cover
seven topics: safety, security, order, care, activities, justice, and administration and
management. ICE, Operations Manual ICE Performance Based National Detention
Standards (2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2008/ (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
116. A report of the government's compliance with the detention standards
"reveale[d] ... pervasive violations." The key findings relating to an immigrant's ability to
represent himself include: (1) visitation-"over 60 facilities failed to post the required list
of pro bono legal services organizations serving the local area," (2) telephone access-"32
facilities failed to allow detainees to make special access calls to courts, consulates, or free
legal service providers and . .. 30 facilities failed to provide a reasonable degree of privacy
for legal phone calls," (3) legal materials-"at least 29 detention facilities had no law
library" and "59 facilities did not make available some or all of the legal material that the
standard requires they have," (4) group legal rights presentations-"133 facilities hosted
no legal rights presentations in the twelve months preceding their annual reviews." Karen
Tumlin, Linton Joaquin & Ranjana Natarajan, A Broken System: Confidential Reports
Reveal Failures in U.S. Immigrant Detention Centers, at vi, viii-x (2009), available at http:/
(on file with the
/www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf
Columbia Law Review).
117. LOPs currently take place in fourteen detention facilities. To view a list of the
facilities, see DOJ, EOIR Legal Orientation and Pro Bono Program [hereinafter EOIR
Legal Orientation and Pro Bono Program], http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/
probono.htm#LOP (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Dec. 2010).
118. Id.
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zations revealed that detention facilities' isolated locations and legal aid

organizations' limited funding and staff mean that many detainees are
unable to secure counsel. 11 9 If a detainee does manage to find an attorney willing to represent him, his problems may not end there as the effectiveness of that representation120 may still be undermined by his inability
to make private phone calls 12 1 and the constant possibility of a trans-

fer. 122 A detainee constantly faces the risk of transfer to another deten-

119. The study found that:
80 percent of detainees were held in facilities which were severely underserved by
legal aid organizations, with more than 100 detainees for every full-time NGO
attorney . . . . More than a quarter of detainees were in facilities ...
where the
ratio was 500 or more detainees per NGO attorney . . .. 10 percent of detainees
were held in facilities in which they had no access to NGO attorneys whatsoever.
Nat'l Immigrant Justice Ctr., Isolated in Detention: Limited Access to Legal Counsel in
Immigration Detention Facilities Jeopardizes a Fair Day in Court 4 (2010).
120. Securing counsel is not enough; rather, it is essential that the detainee secure
competent counsel. Unfortunately, the immigration context has been plagued by
incompetent counsel. See LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring
Competent Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58 Drake L. Rev. 123, 140-50 (2009)
(noting "[o]verburdened [l]awyers," "[r]isk of [f]raud from [u]naccredited
[r]epresentatives," "[d]istance [b]etween available legal representation and location of
detention centers," and "language barriers" as main obstacles to finding competent
counsel in immigration proceedings); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein,
Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 55, 58-59 (2008) ("Low-quality representation is too often the case at the
Immigration Court level . . . . [T]heir representative (1) may not have the appropriate
legal expertise, (2) may be overloaded with too many cases, (3) may not give due attention
and care to individuals, or (4) may even be fraudulent.").
121. Of the sixty-seven detention facilities surveyed regarding detainee phone access,
lawyers were unable to make private phone calls to their detained clients in 78% of the
facilities. Nat'l Immigrant Justice Ctr., supra note 119, at 5.
122. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 1651 ("[D]etainees are often confined at remote
facilities with restrictive phone and visitation policies. Those who have ties to a particular
community, or at least some hope of obtaining representation in the place where they are
initially apprehended, may nevertheless be transferred across the country to an isolated
location."). Transfers can obstruct established attorney-client relationships or sever the
relationships entirely, and they also interfere with a detainee's right to choose counsel.
Human Rights Watch, Locked Up Far Away: The Transfer of Immigrants to Remote
Detention Centers in the United States 41-57 (2009). For detainees seeking bond
hearings, transfers can affect their ability to present evidence of close family relationships,
a stable place to live, and employment possibilities, all of which can be shown to prove the
unlikelihood of absconding. Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interference with Detained Aliens'
Due Process Right to Retain Counsel, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2001, 2005 (1987); Human Rights
Watch, supra, at 58-61. Transfers can affect not only a detainee's access to legal counsel,
but also the law that applies in the detainee's case. Detention facilities within the Fifth
Circuit were most likely to receive transfers. Human Rights Watch, supra, at 36-37. The
Fifth Circuit "is widely known for decisions that are hostile to the rights of noncitizens .... " Id. at 6, 36-37, 41-57.
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tion facility, 123 which may happen at any time to meet ICE's "operational

needs" or "to meet the specialized needs of that detainee." 12 4
In sum, "[d]etention makes it difficult (and costly) for attorneys to
offer representation, for detainees to secure legal counsel, for attorneys
(who represent detainees) to provide effective representation, and for de-

tainees to prepare their own cases." 125
b. Lack of Other Opportunities to Contest Detention. - Despite the difficulties a detained immigrant faces in presenting his case pro se and the

difficulties an attorney may face in effectively representing a detained immigrant, if the IJ decides that the immigrant is "properly included" within

the mandatory detention provision, he is without jurisdiction to conduct
an individualized bond hearing. 126 Thus, the Joseph hearing is the sole

opportunity for an immigrant to seek pre-removal release from detention. However, the heavy "substantially unlikely" burden combined with
the difficulties of pro se representation creates the possibility that an im-

migrant with a credible claim that he has been incorrectly subjected to
mandatory detention could still lose at his Joseph hearing. The strong likelihood that a detainee will fail to meet his burden of proof combined with

123. Transfers are not a rare occurrence. In 2008, an estimated 317,482 detainees
were transferred. Human Rights Watch, supra note 122, at 29. During the first six months
of 2008, 52.4% of detainees were transferred at least once while roughly one in four
detainees was subject to multiple transfers. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC), Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE Detainees (Dec. 2, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/220/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
124. ICE, ICE/DRO Detention Standard: Transfer of Detainees 1, 2 (2008), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/transferof_detainees.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). The only operational need cited is to alleviate
overcrowding. Id. When a detainee is transferred, he "shall not be informed of the transfer
until immediately prior to leaving the facility" and "[f]ollowing notification, the detainee
shall normally not be permitted to make or receive any telephone calls." Id. at 3. His legal
counsel "shall be notified of the transfer once the detainee has arrived at the new
detention location," however, the Deportation Officer may delay notice "[w]hen there are
special security concerns." Id. Studies have found ICE has not complied with transfer
standards. See Office of Inspector Gen., DHS, OIG-09-41, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's Tracking and Transfers of Detainees 8 (2009), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-41_MarO9.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("ICE staff interviewed at the sites visited said they did not notify the detainee's
legal representative because they considered the notifications to be the detainee's
responsibility."). ICE launched an "Online Detainee Locator System," which may partly
ameliorate this problem. The system allows anyone to search for a detainee's current
location by providing the detainee's alien registration number or biographical
information. The system will provide the detention facility's name and contact/visitation
information. ICE, Online Detainee Locator System (2010), available at http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/odls-brochure.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
125. Kerwin, supra note 109, at 7.
126. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(1)(i)(E), (ii) (2011).
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the lack of any other opportunity to contest detention tramples upon the
due process rights of detainees. 127
c. The Automatic Stay Provision. -

If, in the Joseph hearing, the IJ finds

that a detainee was not properly included within the mandatory detention provision and, in the subsequent bond hearing, holds that the detainee meets the release requirements, the IJ will order his release. However, an automatic stay provision allows DHS to stay the IJ's release order
until the BIA rules on their appeal. DHS does this by filing a notice of
intent to appeal within one business day of the IJ's order. 128 After the

2006 revisions to the automatic stay provision, a senior DHS legal official
must also certify that he has approved the filing of the appeal and that

there is evidentiary and legal support for continued detention. 129 The
revisions further provide that the automatic stay lapses ninety days after
the notice of appeal is filed if the BIA has not acted within that time. 13 0

The revisions were meant to resolve the constitutional concerns
presented by the original automatic stay provision; however, the revised
provision is still problematic.1 3 1 First, DHS only has to state that there are
evidentiary and legal arguments supporting continued detention, the revised provision does not require DHS to explain those arguments. Second, DHS's legal arguments do not need to be warranted by current law;
rather, DHS can make any "non-frivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing precedent or the establishment of

new precedent." 132 And although the first court to address the new regulations found them reasonable because of the ninety-day lapse provi-

127. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (declaring Joseph standard's allocation of burden of proof unconstitutional
and advocating that "[o]nly those immigrants who could not raise a 'substantial' argument
against their removability should be subject to mandatory detention"); Wilks v. DHS, Civ.
No. 1:CV-07-2171, 2008 WL 4820654, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2008) ("We also believe that
the so-called Joseph hearing to be conducted during the November 28 proceedings ...
would not satisfy due process."); Gaspar v. Sepulveda, No. C-07-2905 RMW, 2007 WL
1695090, at *2-*3 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2007) (holding "[i]f the Joseph hearing standard is
applied and petitioner is denied bond based upon that standard, petitioner may reapply to
the court to issue an order to show cause" explaining "why respondents should not be
ordered to grant petitioner a Joseph-type hearing that comports with procedural due
process by placing the burden on DHS to establish by clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence that its detention is ... authorized'" (quoting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
at 10, 24, Gaspar, No. C-07-2905 RMW, 2007 WL 1695090)); see also Bhargava, supra note
104, at 76-88 (arguing Joseph hearing procedures violate due process).
128. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2).
129. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(1)(i), (ii).
130. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c) (4). See generally Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court's Order:
The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 89,
97-100 (2010) (providing history of automatic stay provision).
131. See Jorjani, supra note 130, at 100-03 (describing constitutional problems of
pre-2006 automatic stay provision).
132. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(1)(ii).
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sion,13 3 given the various extensions DHS can obtain, the "90 day" limitation can potentially turn into 150 to 177 days, not including the time
spent in detention prior to DHS's appeal of the custody decision. 134 Thus
an immigrant could face months of erroneous detention because of
DHS's unilateral decision to stay his release.
When contesting mandatory detention the burden is on the immigrant detainee and the burden is severe. If he does not meet this burden
he has no further pre-removal opportunity to win release. However, if the

government loses and the IJ orders the immigrant's release, it can keep
the immigrant in detention simply by requesting an automatic stay and
claiming that it has evidentiary and legal arguments supporting continued detention. The next section reveals how detainees at Guantanamo
receive more process than mandatorily detained immigrants.
B. Procedures and Standards Governing Challenges of Detention at

Guantdnamo
This section discusses the procedures for sending a captured individual to Guantinamo, the administrative processes for challenging detention once an individual is being held at Guantanamo, and the final judicial review of the validity of detention in the D.C. District Court via a

habeas petition.
1. How a Captured IndividualIs Sent to Guantdnamo. -

When an individual is captured by U.S. military forces abroad, military officers in the
field assess whether the "captured individual[ ] [was] part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners, or otherwise
135
If the officers
engaged in an armed conflict against the United States."

believe that the individual meets this criteria, he is designated an "enemy
combatant" and sent to a holding facility where a military screening team
reviews the designation and decides whether continued detention is nec136
essary and also whether transfer to Guantanamo is appropriate.

133. Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1032 (E.D. Wis. 2007) ("[P]roviding
for an automatic stay . . . is not unreasonable. The cases upon which Hussain relies to
support his argument that the regulation violates due process addressed the previous
regulation under which the duration of the automatic stay was indefinite.").
134. Jojani, supra note 130, at 106-08. DHS has one day to file its intent to
automatically stay the IJ's order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i) (2). It then has ten days to file the
appeal with the BIA. Id. § 1003.6(c) (1). The ninety-day lapse period is tolled for twentyone days if the detainee asks for an enlargement of the period to file a brief in favor of
release. Id. § 1003.6(c) (4). The appeal lapses in ninety days if the BIA has not acted on it,
but if it does DHS can seek a discretionary stay, which continues detention for up to an
additional thirty days. Id. §§ 1003.6(c) (5), 1003.19(i) (1). If the BIA orders release of the
immigrant, DHS can refer the case to the AG, which stays release for another five days. Id.
§ 1003.6(d). If the AG certifies the case to himself the automatic stay stays in place for
fifteen additional days. Id.
135. Wolfowitz, Order Establishing ARB, supra note 66, at 1.
136. Id. The screening team's assessment is reviewed by an officer designated by the
combatant commander. When deciding whether a detainee should be transferred to
GuantAnamo Bay, the combatant commander considers "the threat posed by the detainee,
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Prior to any detainee's transfer to Guantdnamo, a panel comprised
of Department of Defense officials reviews the decision and advises the
Secretary of Defense on proposed transfers. 13 7 If the Secretary decides to
transfer the detainee, he undergoes further interviews and assessments
immediately upon his arrival. 13 8 The Secretary of Defense makes the ulti-

mate decision as to whether a detainee should be transferred to the custody of a foreign government, released, or should remain detained.1 39
2. Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards.

- Once a detainee has been transferred and held at GuantAnamo he has
an opportunity to challenge his designation as an "enemy combatant"
through an administrative proceeding known as a CSRT.1 4 0 The detainee

does not have a right to legal counsel, but he is assigned a "personal representative" who will assist him throughout the process. 14 1 The personal
representative must be afforded an opportunity to review "any reasonably
available information . . . that may be relevant to a determination of the

detainee's designation as an enemy combatant." 142 The representative
may share this information, except that which is classified, with the
detainee. 143
Thirty days after the personal representative has been allowed to review the information, the CSRT is convened.1 4 4 At the hearing the detainee is allowed to call witnesses "if reasonably available" and to question

witnesses called by the Tribunal. 14 5 The detainee has a right to submit
documentary evidence, and to testify, but cannot be compelled to do
his seniority within hostile forces, possible intelligence that may be gained from the
detainee, possible law of war violations committed by the detainee, and any other relevant
factors." Id. at 2.
137. Id. The review panel considers "all available information" including "information
submitted by other governments or obtained from the detainees themselves." Id.
138. Id. In addition to this review, each Guantanamo detainee undergoes a "threat
assessment," which helps "determine whether, notwithstanding his status as an enemy
combatant, he can be transferred to the custody of another government, can be released,
or should remain detained." Id. Assessments are provided to the Commander of the U.S.
Southern Command for recommendation. Id. The Commander forwards his
recommendation to an interagency committee in Washington, which in turn makes its own
recommendation. Id.
139. Id.
140. Wolfowitz, Order Establishing CSRT, supra note 66, at 1.
141. Memorandum of Gordon England, Sec'y of the Navy, Implementation of
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba 17 (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Personal
Representative must tell the detainee the following: "I am neither a lawyer nor your
advocate, but have been given the responsibility of assisting your preparation for the
hearing. None of the information you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may be
obliged to divulge it at the hearing." Id. at enclosure (3), 3.
142. Wolfowitz, Order Establishing CSRT, supra note 66, at 1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2.
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so. 146 In making its determination, the Tribunal is free to consider "any
information it deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue."1 47

The CSRT decides by the preponderance of evidence whether the detainee is in fact an "enemy combatant," and there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence. 148 If the Tribunal de-

cides that the detainee should no longer be designated an "enemy
combatant," a report of the decision is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and arrangements are made for the detainee's release. 149
However, if the Tribunal rules against the detainee, he still has one
more avenue of administrative review through the nonadversarial
Administrative Review Boards. 150 The ARBs, conducted at least once a
year, provide the detainee with an opportunity to demonstrate that "he is
no longer a threat to the United States and its allies[,] . . . why it is otherwise appropriate that he be released, or any other relevant information." 151 A Designated Military Officer, who is "not an advocate for or
against ... continued detention," provides the Review Board with information in the Department of Defense's possession along with any other
information that indicates whether the detainee should be released,

transferred, or remain in detention. 15 2 The Designated Military Officer
must provide the Review Board with a summary of the main facts favoring
continued detention as well those favoring release. 15 3
Before the hearing, the detainee is provided notice of the hearing
and is given the summary prepared by the Designated Military Officer. 154
The detainee is assisted by a military officer who is permitted to see all
information provided by the Designated Military Officer to the Review
Board.1 55 The Review Board makes a written assessment of whether there
is any reason to believe that the enemy combatant remains a threat, and a
recommendation of whether continued detention is necessary, to the
Designated Civilian Official (DCO), the Department of Defense official
who oversees the ARB process. 156 The DCO makes the final determination of whether the detainee should be released, transferred, or remain
in detention. 15 7

Although the ARB process is the final administrative review of a detainee's designation as an "enemy combatant," all detainees may also seek
judicial review of the designation via a habeas corpus petition in the D.C.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Memorandum of Gordon England, supra note 141, at enclosure 1, 9.
Wolfowtiz, Order Establishing CSRT, supra note 66, at 3-4.
Wolfowitz, Order Establishing ARB, supra note 66, at 3-4.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3, 7-8.
Id. at 8.
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District Court.158 The next section details the standards that D.C. district

judges have developed to govern such cases.
-

3. Standardsfor Habeas Petitions as Stated by the D.C. District Court.

The law surrounding Guantinamo detainees habeas petitions is in a state
of flux, with many questions still unsettled.1

59

However, for the purposes

of this Note, examining the areas where the judges have formed some
sort of consensus is sufficient. Following the Supreme Court's Boumediene

decision, Judge Hogan of the D.C. District Court issued a case management order which set standards intended to govern the Guantinamo detainees' habeas petitions. 16 0 Rather than giving the government's evi-

dence a rebuttable presumption as in the CSRTs, the order placed the
burden on the government to prove that a detainee had been correctly

classified as an "enemy combatant" by a "preponderance of evidence." 161
While most judges have adhered to the allocation of the burden of

proof and the preponderance standard set out in Judge Hogan's case
management order, the question of what standard the Constitution requires at a minimum remains. In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit

rejected a detainee's argument that the court should apply a "beyond a
reasonable doubt," or at least a "clear and convincing" standard, holding
instead that the preponderance standard was constitutionally permissi-

ble. 16 2 The court explicitly refrained from declaring what minimum stan158. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770-71 (2008) (establishing that noncitizens
held at Guantanamo have a right to bring habeas petitions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 509 (2004) ("[D]ue process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an
enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that
detention before a neutral decisionmaker.").
159. See Wittes et al., Emerging Law, supra note 59, at 2-3 ("Some of the parameters
of the law of detention that were altogether unsettled . . . have come into sharper
focus . . . . And lower court judges have, to some degree, fallen into line. On other issues,
by contrast, the law remains more or less as it was then, uncertain and subject to greatly
divergent approaches by district judges with profoundly differing instincts."). Issues that
continue to lack clarity in the D.C. District Court include the scope of the government's
detention authority, whether detainability once established is permanent, whether the
government should receive evidentiary presumptions, the treatment of hearsay evidence,
the role of the "mosaic theory" of evidence, and the admissibility and weight of involuntary
statements. See id. at 32-114 (discussing these issues). The purpose of this Note is to
compare the procedures and standards that immigrant detainees and GuantAnamo
detainees receive, thus these areas are not relevant.
160. Case Management Order, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No.
08-0442 (TFH), at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008).
161. Id. at 4. Benjamin Wittes and his colleagues argue that the consensus among the
district courts on the allocation and calibration of proof "weakens on closer inspection."
Wittes et al., Emerging Law, supra note 59, at 12. The consensus is illusory because "both
appeals court judges and the detainees themselves are attacking the preponderance of the
evidence standard from opposite sides, creating a kind of pincer action against its
continued use." Id. Detainees are pushing for a higher burden of proof, while the D.C.
Circuit has aggressively hinted that a lower burden of proof is likely constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 12-21.
162. 590 F.3d 866, 876-78 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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dard the Constitution requires. 16 3 The D.C. Circuit revisited the issue in

Al-Adahi v. Obama, despite the fact that neither party contested that the
preponderance standard applies.1 64 While the Court emphasized that in
habeas cases the preponderance standard has not been the norm, it concluded that "[a]lthough we doubt. . . that the Suspension Clause requires
the use of the preponderance standard, we will not decide the question
in this case."16 5

Judge Hogan's case management order also established procedures
concerning (1) factual returns, (2) legal justification, (3) exculpatory evi-

dence, (4) discovery, and (5) classified information, among others. 16 6
The order required the government to reveal the factual basis upon
which it is detaining the individual, explain its legal justification for detention, disclose to the detainee all reasonably available exculpatory evidence, and, if requested by the detainee, disclose documents referenced
in factual returns, all statements made by the detainee that relate to information in factual returns, and information about the circumstances
under which such statements were made. 167 The government must provide the detainee's counsel with classified information and the detainee
163. Id. at 878.
164. 613 F.3d 1102, 1103-05 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
165. Id. at 1104-05. Cases after Al-Adahi have continued to require the government to
meet the preponderance standard. See, e.g., Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d. 60, 69
(D.D.C. 2011) ("To justify its detention of an individual, the government must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the individual falls within one of these categories of
detainable persons."); Ali v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Under this
Court's CMO, the Government bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of the
petitioner's detention by a preponderance of the evidence."); Kandari v. United States, 744
F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding "Government has met its burden to show by a
preponderance of the evidence"); Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010)
(applying preponderance standard "[p]ursuant to the Case Management Order"); see also
Wittes et al., Emerging Law, supra note 59, at 12 ("In all of the GuantAnamo habeas cases
that have proceeded to disposition, the judges have required that the government carry
the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the detainee falls within
the definition of the detainable class.").
166. Case Management Order, Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH), at 2-4. These standards
have not been as widely accepted as the allocation of the burden of proof or the
preponderance standard. Judge Hogan has lamented the varying rules and standards
applied to the habeas petitions by different D.C. district judges and has urged Congress to
develop uniform procedures for these cases. See Wittes & Goldsmith, Detention Policy,
supra note 77 ("'It is unfortunate,' [Judge Hogan] said in an oral opinion from the bench,
'that the Legislative Branch of our government and the Executive Branch have not moved
more strongly to provide uniform, clear rules and laws for handling these cases.'"). But see
Azmy, supra note 77, at 537 (arguing detainees' habeas petitions present "challenging
normative, political, and practical considerations" that are "properly within the 'expertise
and competence' of the district courts to manage"). Similarly, in the immigrant detention
context, district courts deciding whether detention was unreasonably prolonged under
section 236(c) examine different factors. See supra note 52 (discussing two courts, within
the same circuit, that examined different factors in habeas petitions brought by detainees
alleging unconstitutionally prolonged detention under INA section 236(c)).
167. Case Management Order, Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH), at 2-4.
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with an adequate substitute. 16 8 Lastly, although GuantAnamo detainees

have no right to counsel paid for by the government, given the novel
constitutional issues their cases present, they have easily obtained pro
bono representation.1 69
C. Explaining the Different Procedures and Standards

A detainee held at Guantanamo receives several levels of review. 170
The detainee's classification as an "enemy combatant" is reviewed first by
various government and military officials (when he is captured, when he

is transferred to Guantanamo, and again once he arrives there), then
through administrative procedures in the CSRTs and ARBs, and lastly judicial review in the D.C. federal courts through a habeas petition. 17 1 A
personal representative or military officer assists the detainee through the
CSRT and ARB processes. In contrast, an immigrant detainee receives
initial review by the ICE district director, administrative review in immi-

gration court, and an appeal to the BIA, which is highly deferential to
DHS.1 72 The government cannot prevent the immigrant detainee from
obtaining counsel, but if he is indigent the government has no obligation
to provide counsel.
Furthermore, when the D.C. District Court reviews a Guantanamo

detainee's habeas petition, the burden is on the government to justify
detention by a preponderance of evidence, while at the Joseph hearing the
burden is on the detained immigrant to show the government is "substantially unlikely" to prevail on its charge of removability against him.
Given the fact that Guantanamo detainees are suspected "enemy
combatants" and immigrant detainees have resided and contributed to
this country for lengthy periods of time, it seems perverse that
GuantAnamo detainees should receive more process and face a less burdensome standard. This Note proposes three explanations for the disparate process Guantanamo and immigrant detainees receive: (1) the fact
that the two sets of detainees are not entirely similarly situated, (2) the
cost of providing additional procedures to immigrant detainees, and (3)
deference to agency decisionmaking.
168. Id. § I.F.
169. See Farah Stockman, Detainee Fight Gets Bigger, Costlier for Long-Battling
Boston Law Firm, Boston Globe, June 25, 2008, at Al ("[Bly 2005, the Center for
Constitutional Rights, a New York-based group coordinating the defense of hundreds of
Guantanamo Bay detainees, had convinced dozens of firms, solo practitioners, and federal
defense counsel that constitutionally protected liberties must be defended.").
170. This Note does not claim the procedures Guantanamo detainees receive are
adequate; it only suggests that GuantAnamo detainees receive more process than
immigrant detainees when challenging detention. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 77, at 475-79
(discussing deficiencies in CSRT process).
171. See supra Part II.B for a detailed discussion of the procedures and standards for
challenging detention at GuantAnamo Bay.
172. See supra Part II.A for a full discussion of the procedures and standards for
challenging immigrant detention.
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1. The Two Sets of Detainees Are Not Similarly Situated. - Perhaps the
most obvious reason why Guantanamo detainees receive more process is
that, given their situation, they simply need more protection.
Guantanamo detainees are less able to defend themselves because they
have never been charged with a crime by the U.S. government and so
may have no idea why they are being detained. Moreover, Guantanamo

detainees are captured in foreign countries and held at Guantanamo,
with no access to the outside world and thus the information, witnesses,
and resources needed to prove their innocence. 7 3
In contrast, immigrant detainees have usually been convicted of
some crime (whether or not it actually subjects them to mandatory detention) and so they, arguably, are not wholly "innocent" like individuals
erroneously detained at Guantanamo. Immigrant detainees also receive a
Notice to Appear (NTA), which initiates removal proceedings and gener-

ally informs the immigrant of why he is being detained. 174 Additionally,
detention facilities are intended to have legal rights presentations, law
libraries, and lists of pro bono counsel to aid the detainee should he
think he has been incorrectly detained. 175 Thus immigrant detaineesbecause they have been convicted of some crime, know why they are in
detention, and have resources to represent themselves or seek counselare not similarly situated to Guantanamo detainees and therefore need
less process.
2. Cost of ProvidingAdditional Procedures. -

Another obvious explana-

tion for the fact that GuantAnamo detainees receive more process than
immigrant detainees is that, given the relatively small number of Guantanamo detainees, the government can afford to provide them additional
process. A total of 779 individuals have been held at Guantanamo Bay.1 76
In contrast, on September 1, 2009, 31,075 immigrants were in detention,
66%-approximately 20,510 individuals-of whom were subject to
mandatory detention.1 7 7 Providing additional procedures to mandatorily
detained immigrants may thus seem prohibitively expensive and burdensome for the government.

.

173. See Azmy, supra note 77, at 447 ("Kurnaz was deemed an 'enemy combatant' ..
part[ly] because his . .. friend ... Bilgin, had 'engaged in a suicide bombing.' ... Yet, not
having seen Bilgin for years and without access to any information [or] counsel, all Kurnaz
could say ... was that he had no idea Bilgin had ever done anything violent. . . ." (quoting
Declaration of James R. Crisfield Jr. at 11, Karnaz v. Bush, Civil Action No. 04-CV-1135
(ESH) (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2004))).
174. INA § 239(a)(1)(A)-(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (1)(A)-(D) (2006). If the NTA does
not provide the basis for detention, the government must notify the detainee of the basis
and provide him with an opportunity to contest detention. Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 127
(B.I.A. 2007).
175. See supra notes 116, 119, and accompanying text for a discussion of government
noncompliance with these detention standards.
176. The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 83.
177. Schriro Report, supra note 53, at 6. The report did not indicate how many of the
20,510 were LPRs.
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3. Deference. - The Joseph hearing and the standards that govern it
were established by the BIA. As an agency, the BIA receives a great
amount of freedom when interpreting statutes and regulations, and when

developing standards related to its area of expertise. 178 In contrast, the
procedures and standards governing Guantanamo detention were developed by the Executive and Congress, whose actions the judiciary is meant
to check.

However, when the Executive and Congress act in concert, as they
seemed to in the post-September 11 context, their decisions generally de-

serve great deference from the courts. 179 Moreover, during times of national emergency, which the time immediately after September 11 certainly was, the courts are usually highly deferential to the political

branches of the government because courts lack institutional competence
to make decisions during a crisis.1 80 Thus deference cannot fully explain

the different procedures and standards that have developed.
Instead of deferring to the Executive, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld Justice

O'Connor applied the Mathews v. Eldridge test to demonstrate why
Guantinamo detainees need more procedures to protect against erroneous detention.1

81

Using Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Hamdi, and ap-

plying the Mathews test, the next part of this Note first shows that in the
immigrant detention context more protections are also appropriate and
then proposes such protections.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: REFORMING IMMIGRANT CHALLENGES TO

DETENTION IN LIGHT OF GUANTANAMO PROCEDURES

The key procedural difference between a Guantinamo detainee's
challenge to his detention and that of an immigrant detainee is that the
Guantanamo detainee receives several levels of review. Each stage of review is meant to make up for procedural deficiencies in the earlier stage.
This Note suggests using the structure of process Guantanamo detainees
receive and the standard that governs their challenges to detention as
guides for reforming challenges to immigrant detention. To that end,
178. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45
(1984) (ordering judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes within their authority to administer because of agencies' greater expertise). No
high court has ruled on the sufficiency of the Joseph hearing. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 514 n.3 (2003) ("[W]e have no occasion to review the adequacy of Joseph hearings
generally in screening out those who are improperly detained pursuant to § 1226(c).").
179. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum" and deserves "the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation").
180. See Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future ofJustice in the Age of
Terror 117 (2008) (arguing judiciary is not competent to evaluate military actions because
of "the limits of judges as people untrained in military matters and the limits of evidence
collected in a fashion so far removed from the one to which judges are accustomed").
181. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529-35 (2004).
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section A uses the Mathews test and LPRs' status as members of American
society to establish why Joseph hearings violate LPRs' due process rights.
Section B suggests a new framework for reviewing immigrant detention,
by implementing protections before detention, by altering the Joseph
hearing standard so that it is less burdensome, and by adding a review
process after an immigrant has been detained. Because changing the entire framework for review may take time to implement and perfect, section C suggests three changes-providing counsel, expanding the Legal
Orientation Program, and making the National Detention Standards legally enforceable-that can be implemented within the current Joseph
hearing framework to provide detainees with greater safeguards to protect against erroneous detention.
A. Why LPRs Deserve More Process
Currently, immigrant detainees must meet a high standard when
challenging the legality of their detention through administrative procedures. In contrast, detainees at Guantanamo Bay receive more review and
have to meet a less onerous burden. Detention at Guantinamo Bay is the
latest form of executive detention the Supreme Court has reviewed for
adequacy of process and for which the lower courts have begun to establish minimum procedural safeguards. Guantanamo is thus the best guide
to what the courts believe the Constitution requires when the Executive
detains an LPR. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hamdi, as explained in
greater detail below, suggests that the government must provide more
than barebones procedures to protect against erroneous detention when
exercising its detention authority. This section shows how the government has failed to do so in the immigration context.
1. Current Procedures Fail the Mathews Test. - In Hamdi, Justice
O'Connor employed the Mathews test to decide what process was due to
alleged "enemy combatants" challenging their detention. 18 2 The Mathews
test determines if procedures provided before the government deprives
an individual of a right satisfy due process by weighing the affected private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the value of additional procedures, against the government interest, including the burden
of providing additional procedures. 183 The Supreme Court has stated
that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to immigrants 184 and has itself applied the Mathews test in the immigration
context. 18 5
182. Id. at 529.
183. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
184. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) ("There are literally millions of
[noncitizens] within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.").
185. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (applying Mathews test to
determine if LPR had been afforded due process in immigration proceeding).
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In applying the test, Justice O'Connor heavily weighed Hamdi's interest in physical liberty. She referred to physical liberty as "the most elemental of liberty interests" and stated that its importance was not offset by
the war context or the "enemy combatant" accusation. 186 Justice
O'Connor then stressed the "very real" risk of erroneous deprivation of
that liberty in the absence of sufficient process in this context. 187 Lastly,
while O'Connor recognized the "weighty and sensitive" government interests in detaining those who pose a threat to national security and in
reducing the procedures available given the practical difficulties of the
war context, she did not accept the incredibly deferential standard the
government had advanced. 188
The Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush again assessed the adequacy of the process afforded to Guantinamo detainees and again found
it lacking, despite the administration's addition of CSRTs allowing detainees to contest enemy combatant allegations and exclusive review of determinations in the D.C. Circuit. 189 The Court emphasized that "the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier
proceedings" and that this "accords with our test for procedural adequacy
in the due process context." 190 Thus "[w]here a person is detained by
executive order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a
court, the need for collateral review is most pressing." 19 1 The Court as-

sessed the CSRT and found that there was considerable risk of error in
the tribunal's findings.1 92 The review of the CSRT's findings allowed by
the DTA was an inadequate process to make up for the CSRT's deficiencies, and thus an inadequate replacement for habeas, as it did not allow
detainees at Guantinamo "to challenge the President's legal authority to
detain them, contest the CSRT's findings of fact, supplement the record
on review with exculpatory evidence, and request an order of release." 193
Many of the same concerns Justice O'Connor highlighted in Hamdi
as reasons for providing Guantinamo detainees more process are relevant to the immigration context. Justice O'Connor's fear of an unchecked system of detention as one reason to require more than minimal
protections is especially relevant because immigrants are particularly vul186. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-30.
187. Id. at 530.
188. Id. at 527-28, 531. The government put forth the "some evidence" standard,
under which "a court would assume the accuracy of the Government's articulated basis
for ... detention ... and assess only whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one."
Id. at 527-28.
189. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the background of the
GuantAnamo litigation and note 69 for a discussion of the very limited judicial review the
DTA allowed.

190. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781.
191. Id. at 783.

192. Id. at 785.
193. Id. at 792.
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nerable to abuse. 194 Since the Court was unwilling to find the "enemy
combatant" accusation or the war context enough to justify providing
only minimal protections against erroneous detention, the assertion that
the immigrant falls under mandatory detention or the immigration context 195-less grave situations-similarly should not be enough justifica-

tion. Moreover the Court in Boumediene made clear that in the case of
executive detention, because no court order has led to the detention,
collateral review of the detention decision must adequately safeguard
against earlier deficiencies. 196
a. PrivateInterest. - Alleged "enemy combatants" and immigrant detainees have equal interests in not being erroneously detained. As noted
previously, the Supreme Court has found those interests in physical liberty to be great. 197 However, unlike Guantinamo detainees, immigrant
detainees must overcome two hurdles before they can return to their former lives: (1) the Joseph hearing and (2) the final removal hearing. Losing at the Joseph hearing has grave implications for success at the final
removal hearing because detention undermines immigrants' ability to

build their removal case by separating them from evidence, witnesses,
and counsel.1 98 As discussed in Part II.A.3.a, even if a detainee does manage to retain counsel, detention facilities' remote locations, restrictive visitation policies, and lack of privacy impede the effectiveness of that counsel. Many detention facilities' lack of legal material, or outdated
materials, also prevents pro se detainees from mounting successful challenges in removal hearings. Lastly, the conditions of confinement en-

courage detainees to forego procedural rights, such as appeals, or pursue
claims that may prolong detention. 19 9
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an immigrant's interest
in remaining in the United States is "a weighty one" as the immigrant
"stands to lose the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of free194. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 161 (1980) (noting "[noncitizens]
cannot vote in any state" and that "[h]ostility toward 'foreigners' is a time-honored
American tradition").
195. The government has traditionally received significant deference in the
immigration context under the "plenary power" doctrine; however, it is unlikely that this
deference is more than the deference the government receives in the war context. See
generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990)
(describing plenary power doctrine).
196. See supra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing importance of physical
liberty under Supreme Court precedent).
198. See Michele R. Pistone,Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A Proposal for Ending
the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 197, 216-24 (1999)
(discussing how detention of asylum seekers impedes ability to satisfy burdens of proof and
persuasion, prepare cases, testify credibly, and meet legal standards, but encourages
abandonment of valid claims); Kaufman, supra note 109, at 126-30 (discussing barriers to
representation and case preparation facing immigrant detainees).
199. Kaufman, supra note 109, at 129-30.
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dom,'" and "may lose the right to rejoin ...
immediate family, a right
that ranks high among the interests of the individual." 200 Thus an immigrant's liberty interest combined with the interest in remaining in the

United States, both weighty on their own, should require a truly compelling government interest to outweigh them.
b. Government Interest. - The government's interests in detaining immigrants who allegedly fall under mandatory detention and providing
them minimal process are three: (1) protecting society from criminal im-

migrants, (2) ensuring that these immigrants appear at removal proceedings, and (3) not further burdening the immigration system. The first two
concerns are not issues because, even if an immigrant receives additional

process, he will still have to prove that he is not a flight risk or a danger to
society at a bond hearing before he can win release. 20 1
The government may argue that minimal procedures are appropri-

ate in this context because, unlike Guantinamo, there is little risk of indefinite detention. However, this is not true as there are a growing number of immigrants remaining in mandatory detention for prolonged
periods. 20 2 Moreover, the reason the government sought minimal protections for Guantinamo detainees was because of the practical difficulties
of a trial-like process in a military context-an issue not implicated

here. 20S Lastly, additional procedures, as the next section demonstrates,
can be tailored to limit the burden on the government and may actually
further the government's own interests in fair trials and correct
outcomes.
c. Risk ofErroneousDetention. -

Perhaps most importantly, the risk of

erroneous detention under the current procedures is just as real in the
immigration context as it is in Guantinamo. Three judicial opinions con-

sidering the issue have suggested that the Joseph hearing standard violates
due process. 204 Several factors combine to create a strong likelihood that
an erroneously detained immigrant will remain in detention: (1) the dif-

ficulty of representing oneself pro se given the complexity of immigration
law, (2) the lack of legal resources available to prepare one's case, (3) the
constant possibility of a transfer to another detention facility, and (4) the
incredibly high standard one must meet to successfully challenge
detention. 205
200. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 154 (1945)).
201. Additionally, a 2009 study by DHS itself stated that the immigrant detainee
population was of low custody and had a low propensity for violence. Schriro Report, supra
note 53, at 2.
202. Kerwin & Lin, supra note 57, at 16-17.
203. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531-32 (2004) ("In [the government's]
view, military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be
unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away, and discovery into
military operations would . . . intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense . .. ).
204. See supra note 127 for a discussion of these opinions.
205. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing procedural problems with Joseph hearings).
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The immigrant detainee's interest in physical liberty and remaining
in the United States combined with the real risk of erroneous detention
under the current procedures, clearly outweigh the government's three
interests. Not only do the current procedures fail the Mathews test, but
they also make little sense given LPRs' status as members of the American
community.
d. LPRs, as Members of the American Community, Deserve Greater
Protections. - LPRs' status as members of the American community indi-

cates that they deserve more procedural protections than Guantinamo
detainees. Currently, however, LPRs receive minimal protections to safe-

guard against erroneous detention. This seems impossible to reconcile
with the historical conception of LPRs' status in American society:
Historically and psychologically, admission in [the LPR] category amounts to an invitation to full membership in the society
and eventually the polity. Immigrants-that is, [noncitizens] se-

lected for lawful permanent resident status-pass through the
most rigorous screening our immigration system imposes. But
having done so, they are then invited to become part of our
community, to sink roots-permanent roots-and to chart out

life plans in reliance on enduring rights to remain. 206
LPRs have lived permanently in the United States-they work, pay
taxes, and raise their families here-often contributing to American society in ways indistinguishable from those of U.S. citizens. LPRs thus have a
great stake in not being detained and hence are likely to contest detention. Given their strong connections to the United States and contributions to our society, LPRs should receive greater, not lesser, procedural
protections than those given to alleged "enemy combatants," most of
whom have no connection whatsoever to the United States-the fact that
the opposite is true thus seems perverse.
To ameliorate this confused state of affairs, the next section presents
ways in which the government can provide immigrant detainees more
process and make the standard for challenging detention less burdensome by reexamining current procedures in light of protections executive detainees at Guantinamo Bay receive.
B. A New Framework for Review
The current framework for an immigrant detainee to challenge his

detention-through a Joseph hearing in immigration court-is equivalent
to Guantinamo detainees' CSRT process. Both administrative proceedings are highly deferential to the government's position and require the
206. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens:
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 102; see also Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510, 543-44 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The constitutional protection of a[ ]
[noncitizen's] person ... is particularly strong in the case of [LPRs]. The immigration laws
give LPRs the opportunity to establish a life permanently in this country by developing
economic, familial, and social ties indistinguishable from those of a citizen.").
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detainee to prove he is not an enemy combatant, or subject to mandatory
detention, thus creating the potential for erroneous detention. 20 7 However, unlike in the GuantAnamo context, which offers procedural protections before and after the CSRT determination, the framework for challenging mandatory immigrant detention begins and ends here. This
section proposes a new framework for reviewing immigrant detention by

adding procedural protections before detention, altering the Joseph hearing standard so it is less burdensome, and providing additional review

during detention, using the current GuantAnamo structure as a model.
1. Protections Before Detention. -

Before a captured individual is sent

to GuantAnamo a number of military and Department of Defense officials
must review his classification as an "enemy combatant" and approve detention. 208 A similar review mechanism prior to subjecting an immigrant

to mandatory detention should be put in place. Such a mechanism is
already in place when an ICE official seeks to detain an immigrant not
subject to mandatory detention-he must first obtain approval from the
field office director. 20 9 Review by the field office director is appropriate
for those not subject to mandatory detention because the determination
there does not require a legal judgment-the director simply needs to
decide whether the immigrant poses a flight risk or a danger to the
community.
Before an ICE official can subject any immigrant to mandatory de-

tention, he should be required to first seek review by ICE legal counsel.
In fact, the previous detention priority memo specifically stated that questions of whether an immigrant falls under one of the mandatory detention provisions must be directed to legal counsel. 2 10 This Note suggests
207. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999) ("[T]he Immigration Judge must
have very substantial grounds to override the Service's decision to charge the [noncitizen]
with a ground that subjects the [noncitizen] to detention."). The CSRT hearing accords a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's position. Wolfowitz, Order
Establishing CSRT, supra note 66, at 3; see also supra Part II.A.2 (explaining Joseph
hearings); supra at Part II.B.2 (discussing CSRT process).
208. Wolfowitz, Order Establishing ARB, supra note 66, at 2; see also supra Part II.B.1
(explaining process whereby captured individuals are sent to GuantAnamo).
209. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, ICE, to All ICE Employees,
Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens 4 (June 30, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
210. Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Undersec'y for Border and Transp. Sec., to
Robert C. Bonner, Comm'r, CBP, and Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Sec'y, ICE, Detention
Prioritization and Notice to Appear Documentary Requirements 2 (Oct. 18, 2004) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). On September 1, 2009, 31,075 immigrants were in ICE
custody, 66% of whom-approximately 20,510 individuals-were subject to mandatory
detention, leaving 10,565 individuals detained who did not fall under mandatory
detention. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. If only twenty-four field office
directors can review 10,565 individuals' detention, it is not unreasonable to think ICE's
much larger base of legal counsel can review the detention of the 20,510 remaining
individuals who are LPRs. For a list of the twenty-four field offices, see ICE, Enforcement
and Removal Operations, http://www.ice.gov/contact/ero/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
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that such review should be required in every case. If ICE legal counsel
catches an error at this point it will benefit everyone-the immigrant will
be saved from prolonged loss of physical liberty, ICE will save the cost of

having to detain that individual, and it will take one case off of already
overcrowded immigration court dockets. 211
2. Shifting the Burden of Proof in Joseph Hearings. -

When a

GuantAnamo detainee brings a habeas petition, the government mustjustify detention by the preponderance of the evidence standard. The fact
that the courts have been willing to put the burden on the government

despite the national security context lends strong support to the argument that in all contexts where the government seeks to detain an individual the government should justify the detention. Furthermore, in civil
commitment cases the Supreme Court has required the government to
justify confinement and has required a higher burden of proof than preponderance of the evidence. 212 The ultimate end of immigrant detention
is removal, which the Supreme Court has deemed a civil, rather than a
criminal, procedure.2 13 Thus, following the Supreme Court's civil
commitment precedents, the burden in Joseph hearings should be shifted
to the government and the burden of proof should be high. This Note
proposes that when a detainee challenges detention, the government
should have to prove that it is substantially likely to prevail on a charge of
removability against the immigrant specified in section 236(c) (1).214
3. Protections During Detention. - Once a detainee has been transferred to Guantdnamo he has an opportunity to challenge his classification as an "enemy combatant" through a CSRT. If he fails to convince the
tribunal, his status is reviewed again, at least once a year, by the ARB. As
explained above, in the immigration context the Joseph hearing is similar
to the CSRT. However, immigrants who lose at their Joseph hearings have
no further way to challenge their detention-a major procedural defect,
especially given the high burden immigrants must meet to succeed at the
hearing.

211. See infra text accompanying notes 226-227 (discussing costs of detention).
212. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing "[fireedom from physical restraint being a fundamental right, the State must
have a particularly convincing reason" justifying detention and striking down statute
allowing criminal defendant acquitted due to insanity to be committed to psychiatric
institution until he could prove he was not a danger to himself or others); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (requiring state to justify civil commitment of
individual by clear and convincing proof).
213. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) ("Deportation, however
severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal
procedure.").
214. Shalini Bhargava similarly suggests that the burden of proof should be on the
government inJoseph hearings; however, instead of keeping the substantially unlikely/likely
standard she suggests a preponderance standard, at the least. Bhargava, supra note 104, at
87-88.
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Detention in the immigration context would benefit from a review
process similar to the ARB. An appropriate review time is six months into

detention, the presumptive limit the Supreme Court set for detention of
immigrants under section 241(a) (6).215 All immigrant detainees detained
under the authority of section 236(c), whether or not they initially requested a Joseph hearing, should have their detention reviewed at the sixmonth point to ensure an appropriate determination was made initially.
The number of immigrant detainees remaining in detention for six
months or more is small, but significant enough for this to be a manageable and worthwhile endeavor. 21 6 If the process is nonadversarial, as the
ARB is, the government will expend fewer resources as it will not need to

send trial attorneys to defend continued detention. Such a review process
may also help reduce the costs related to protracted litigation, which the
current framework facilitates, 21 7 and if an immigrant is cleared at this
stage the government will also save significant detention costs.
This Note does not recommend the review process take place within
DHS as ICE officials make the initial decision to detain the immigrant,

and review within the same department may cast doubt on the neutrality
of the process. The DOJ currently houses both immigration-related administrative review bodies and is thus the most appropriate place to review mandatory immigrant detention decisions. After the Supreme
Court's Zadvydas decision, a new type of hearing-continued detention
review-was established to assess whether noncitizens with final orders of
removal whose removal ICE had been unable to effectuate should remain
in custody. 21 8 This hearing takes place before an IJ in immigration court.
Assessing mandatory detention would also constitute a form of "contin-

ued detention review." However, instead of further burdening already
overcrowded immigration court dockets, this Note suggests all continued

detention review take place before a separate, independent body within
the DOJ.
C. Protecting Immigrant Detainees Under the Existing Framework
While altering the entire framework for reviewing mandatory deten-

tion decisions may take some time, there are many practical changes that
the government can implement within the current review system to ensure that immigrants are not erroneously detained. This section proposes

three such changes: (1) providing some form of legal counsel, (2) ex215. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
216. On January 25, 2009, there were 2362 immigrants in detention who had been
detained for six months or more. Kerwin & Lin, supra note 57, at 1, 16.
217. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring)
("[N]early 30 months later, Tijani remains in mandatory detention while courts continue
to sort out whether his offenses actually fall within the reach of the mandatory detention
statute.").
218. EOIR Statistical Yearbook 2009, supra note 112, at C2. Only one continued
detention hearing was requested and completed in 2009. Id. at C3.
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panding LOPs, and (3) making the National Detention Standards legally
enforceable.
1. Providing Counsel. -

At the CSRT and ARB stage Guantinamo

detainees are assisted by personal representatives and, while they have no
right to counsel paid for by the government, they have easily obtained
pro bono representation in their habeas petitions. 2 19 In contrast, most
immigrant detainees appear in court without any assistance, 220 even
though studies have shown that competent legal representation can
greatly aid a noncitizen's immigration case. 22 1 This Note suggests that the
government should provide an immigrant who requests a Joseph hearing
with some form of legal counsel. 222 Providing an immigrant with legal
counsel during the Joseph hearing promotes three important goals: (1)
fairness and the legitimacy of the system, (2) correct outcomes, and (3)
immigration court efficiency.
When pro se immigrants, often lacking fluency in the English language, appear in immigration court to contest their case against skilled
government trial attorneys, the hearing can seem like a farce. 2 23 Such a
trial undermines the legitimacy of immigration court proceedings and
seems incredibly unfair to indigent LPRs-who have often developed
strong ties in this country over a lengthy period of residence and so have
a strong interest in not being erroneously detained. Moreover, the IJ is

more likely to reach a correct outcome if both sides of the issue are advocated forcefully, but given the complexity of immigration law, a pro se
immigrant may have a hard time understanding the law, let alone applying it correctly to his case.

Ideally, the government should provide all detainees who wish a
Joseph hearing an attorney; 224 however, a more cost-effective option would
be to provide a BIA accredited representative. Federal regulation
currently allows non-attorneys who work for BIA recognized nonprofit
religious, charitable, or social service agencies to represent immigrants in
219. See Stockman, supra note 169 (describing pro bono efforts of several large firms
on Guantanamo cases).
220. See supra note 112 (listing statistics on legal representation of immigrant
detainees).
221. See Kerwin, supra note 109, at 6 ("Represented detainees received relief in 24%
of their cases, compared to 15% for unrepresented detainees.").
222. The right to appointed counsel in cases where an individual's physical liberty is
at stake has been recognized by the Supreme Court: "The pre-eminent generalization that
emerges from this Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that
such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical
liberty if he loses the litigation." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
223. See Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 728-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing how
immigration court proceedings involving pro se immigrant had violated requirement of
full and fair hearing).
224. See generally Kerwin, supra note 109, at 13-16 (presenting three models for
legal representation of immigrant detainees).
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immigration court. 225 These accredited representatives would serve the
function of the Guantdnamo detainees' non-attorney personal representatives; however, the immigration context should improve upon that
model by allowing the accredited representative to advocate on behalf of
the immigrant.
The major argument against providing all mandatorily detained immigrants with counsel is the cost of such a measure. However, detention

itself is incredibly costly. For fiscal year 2010, ICE's Enforcement and
Removal Operations was allocated a budget of $1.77 billion for custody
operations. 226 Estimates of the cost of detention per night range from
$95 to $141.227 Other costs to the government include the cost of transportation, the cost of adding another case to already overcrowded immigration court dockets, 228 and the cost of government trial attorneys work-

ing on the case. Detention also has a broader cost to the government and
to American society in general: Detention deprives us of productive members of society. Additional procedures may help catch errors earlier in the
process and thus save the government and society these detention costs.

-

Part of the cost of providing counsel can be managed by providing
accredited representatives instead of attorneys. Providing counsel may
also have benefits that will help overcome the cost. For one, providing
counsel will increase court efficiency. Because most detainees appear pro
se, IJs have to spend significant time explaining court procedures 22 9

counsel would eliminate that need. Evidence has also shown that legal
representation "financially benefits the government by leading to im-

proved appearance rates in courts, fewer requests for continuances and
shorter periods of detention" and by deterring frivolous claims. 230

225. 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a) (4), 292.2 (2011). There are five individuals who may
represent immigrants in immigration court: (1) attorneys, (2) recent law graduates under
the supervision of an attorney or accredited representative, or law students in a legal aid
program or clinic, (3) reputable individuals who have a pre-existing relationship with the
immigrant, (4) accredited representatives, and (5) an accredited official of the
government to which the immigrant owes allegiance. Id. § 292.1(a).
226. Office of Immigration Affairs, DHS, Factsheet: ICE Fiscal Year 2010 Enacted
Budget 2 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/doc/
2010budgetfactsheet.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
227. Kerwin & Lin, supra note 57, at 4-5.
228. See TRAC, Immigration Courts Taking Longer to Reach Decisions (Nov. 11,
2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/244 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("The average number of days it took to dispose of cases decided during FY 2010
was 280 days, 47 days longer on average than completion times for FY 2009."); TRAC, As FY
2010 Ends, Immigration Case Backlog Still Growing (Oct. 21, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/242 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The number of cases
awaiting resolution before the Immigration Courts reached a new all-time high of 261,083
by the end of September 2010 . . .. ").
229. See EOIR Statistical Yearbook 2009, supra note 112, at Gi ("[IJs], in order to
ensure that [pro se] individuals understand the nature of the proceedings, as well as their
rights and responsibilities, must take extra care and spend additional time explaining this
information.").
230. Kerwin, supra note 109, at 16-17.
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Because Congress would have to make the ultimate decision to pro-

vide all immigrant detainees with attorneys, or accredited representatives,
this suggestion would take time to put in place. The next section proposes a change that may be easier to achieve.
2. Expanding Legal Orientation Programs. -

Because the LOP is al-

ready established, increasing funding to expand LOP is a goal that can be
achieved much more quickly. Like providing counsel, the benefits of LOP

may offset the costs. These benefits include: (1) effectively preparing detainees to proceed pro se, (2) moving participants through immigration
court faster, (3) increasing immigration court efficiency, and (4) improv-

ing detention conditions. 23 1 Currently only fourteen detention facilities
receive LOP services. 232
Funding for LOP should be expanded to reach all detention facilities and an LOP designed specifically for Joseph hearings should be developed. This Note suggests a two-part LOP: (1) an initial screening process

and (2) targeted services for immigrants referred from the screening process. At the first session, the LOP attorneys would briefly meet with each

detainee held pursuant to the mandatory detention provision to determine which detainees have credible claims that they have been incor-

3. Making the National Detention Standards Legally Enforceable.

-

rectly detained. These immigrants would then be referred to receive intensive LOP services to prepare them to proceed pro se in their Joseph
hearings.
GuantAnamo detainees, or their personal representatives, are provided
with the legal justification for detention and exculpatory information to
help challenge their classification as "enemy combatants." The NTA pro-

vides immigrant detainees with the legal basis for detention, but detainees also need access to legal materials to determine whether their detention is lawful. The National Detention Standards require that all
detention facilities have law libraries with up to date legal materials, but
because the standards are not legally enforceable there have been many

231. The Vera Institute of Justice evaluated the impact of the program from 2005
through September 2007. The report found that detainees who participated in the LOP
had immigration court cases that were on average thirteen days shorter than cases for
detainees who did not participate in LOP and that some detainees who received intensive
LOP services and went on to represent themselves pro se achieved case outcomes that were
close to those represented individuals achieve. Vera Inst. of Justice, Legal Orientation
Program: Evaluation and Performance and Outcome Measurement Report, Phase II, at iv
(2008). Detention facility employees at LOP sites commented that when detainees have
access to legal information they have observed reduced behavior problems and that LOP
overall makes detention "more humane." Id at v. Perhaps most important for Congress, IJs
reported that LOP participants appeared in court better prepared, had a better
understanding of immigration court proceedings, were better able to identify relief
available to them and relief that was not available to them, and fewer LOP participants
failed to appear for their hearings upon release from detention-all contributing to
improving court efficiencies. Id.
232. EOIR Legal Orientation and Pro Bono Program, supra note 117.
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documented violations.2 33 To ensure that all immigrant detainees have
access to the legal resources they need to challenge detention, the deten-

tion standards should be legally enforceable by detainees and members
of the public. If relief is limited to requiring the detention facility to comply with the violated standard, this change should not be overly burdensome as it would simply require detention facilities to provide resources
they already should have been providing.
CONCLUSION

Mr. B spent four years in mandatory immigrant detention despite
the fact that the underlying crimes for which ICE alleged he was detainable were not aggravated felonies and an IJ had even ruled so. Mr. B's
case thus reveals that the current framework for reviewing immigrant

challenges to detention provides inadequate protections to prevent
against erroneous detention. When compared to the greater process alleged "enemy combatants" held at Guantanamo receive, the inadequacy
of the procedures immigrant detainees receive becomes apparent. It
makes little sense that LPRs should receive less protection than
Guantinamo detainees, given the national security implications of the
Guantanamo context and the strong ties LPRs have to the United States.

Such a state of affairs threatens the legitimacy of executive detention.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld suggests that, no
matter what the context, the government must provide adequate procedures to protect against erroneous detention when it chooses to exercise
its detention power. The Guantanamo context reveals that several levels

of review and a standard that requires the government justify detention
may ensure that procedural deficiencies in earlier stages of detention review are caught. Altering the framework of review so that it is more con-

sistent with this approach and ensuring that immigrant detainees have
tools to fight detention in the manner suggested by this Note would serve
several important objectives. Such changes would align procedures to
challenge detention with the historically favored status of LPRs, increase
the legitimacy of executive detention, and, most importantly, ensure im-

migrant detainees have a fair opportunity to contest detention and that
those erroneously detained are quickly screened out and allowed to return to their lives as productive members of the American community.

233. See supra notes 116, 119, and accompanying text for reported violations of the
standards.

